Talk:Space Shuttle Challenger disaster/Archive 3

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Overmyer quote

@Smuckola: Just looking to clarify our back-and-forth on the Overmyer quote. I removed it because there's not additional evidence that Overmyer gives, in either that quote or the article that is referenced, to support his conclusion that the crew was alive. I understand that Overmyer was closer to the situation than some Wikipedia editor 35 years later, but it's a stretch to give weight to his conclusion when the official NASA report was that it was inconclusive. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 12:04, 31 October 2020 (UTC)

@Balon Greyjoy: Hey there, you're doing a lot of really good work on such an honorable subject. My perspective is of course what is the most encyclopedic, but also as a layperson who's truly trying to understand the subject matter from the outside. This is a bewilderingly complex subject involving countless disciplines and a bunch of subterfuge, deceit, and confusion even by experts. Even our summary must be re-read countless times to be understood or even believed, so it bears both the summary and the excerpts. The reason why that quote is encyclopedic is because 1) it is not unencyclopedic according to WP:UNDUE at a fraction of a percent of a mountain of prose, and 2) because it does actually enhance the reader's understanding. All of humanity (including RSes) is speculating forever on what exactly happened to that crew in the final moments, and we made it perfectly clear that this quote is speculation, and after all the facts are given, that's what remains and it's the most authoritative speculation there is among so much other speculation. The quotes help to conclude the preceding facts by saying basically that we can't know and all that remains is indeed speculation. It's the conclusion of the highest authority, personally and professionally, which enhanced the reading of the content. It gives insight into who performed the investigation. So that's a lot more than just my two cents. Both quotes are encyclopedic and there's simply no reason to remove them. I celebrate your correct principles, which would apply to most other situations. I know you're trying to consolidate overall but you've even deleted some vital facts. That other thing I reverted here definitely wrecked the meaning and that's why it needs two paragraphs. I restored the "citation needed" that you'd added, but the page number is already given directly inside the citation so "rp" is redundant; the whole citation is at page 245. Anyway I can see that you have competency in a very complex subject with NASA background so thank you. — Smuckola(talk) 20:33, 31 October 2020 (UTC)

Quotes in the "Cause and time of death" sub-section

@Smuckola: Looking to cool off our WP:EDITWAR and discuss some of the disagreements we have on this sub-section. In particular, my opinion is that this sub-section unnecessarily uses direct quotes from Mike Mullane, Joseph Kerwin, and Bob Overmyer, while it appears that you believe the opposite is true. My general opinion towards quotations is driven by MOS:QUOTE, particularly the part: "It is generally recommended that content be written in Wikipedia editors' own words. Consider paraphrasing quotations into plain and concise text when appropriate..." (the irony of including a direct quote doesn't escape me). In general, I think direct quotes should be avoided, and are only required when the exact wording is appropriate, such as a speech (Reagan's speech) or communications during important moments (such as the flight controllers immediately after the breakup). To come to an agreement instead of immediately reverting any changes, I think we should go quote-by-quote to discuss their inclusion or the lack thereof.

*Mullane

• "There had been nothing in our training concerning the activation of a PEAP in the event of an in-flight emergency."

  This could be paraphrased to just say that they didn't go through training to use the PEAP in such a scenario. It's not particular to something Mullane said, but just a reality of astronaut training.

  "The fact that Judy or El had done so for Mike Smith made them heroic in my mind."

  Mullane was very close with Resnik in particular. While he respects his friends for their actions during the emergency, his opinion of them had no impact on their survival.

I'm actually okay with this quote. It emphasizes the narrative.--Neopeius (talk) 12:59, 1 November 2020 (UTC)

I disagree here. I think that the narrative that we care about in this part is that the crew was briefly alive and conscious post-breakup, which is made clear in the crew taking actions. Whether Resnik or Onizuka were acting out of heroism, reflex, or another motive doesn't change the facts, let alone that it's Mullane's opinion after-the-fact. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 08:42, 2 November 2020 (UTC)

• "These switches were protected with lever locks that required them to be pulled outward against a spring force before they could be moved to a new position."

  This could be paraphrased to just say that the switches were protected and had to be manually moved. This is probably the quote I would most recommend leaving in, but I believe it can be paraphrased.

Here, I agree. Indeed, the sentence could be eliminated without hurting the flow.--Neopeius (talk) 12:59, 1 November 2020 (UTC)

• Furthermore, Mullane's conclusion that Onizuka and Resnik had their PEAPs activated directly contradicts Kerwin's report, which stated it was inconclusive.

This discrepancy should be resolved.--Neopeius (talk) 12:59, 1 November 2020 (UTC)

I'm going to have to side with the official Kerwin report for this one; it's a stronger source than Mullane's book with regard to the accident. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 08:46, 2 November 2020 (UTC)

*Kerwin

• "The findings are inconclusive. The impact of the crew compartment with the ocean surface was so violent that evidence of damage occurring in the seconds which followed the disintegration was masked. Our final conclusions are:

  the cause of death of the Challenger astronauts cannot be positively determined;

  the forces to which the crew were exposed during Orbiter breakup were probably not sufficient to cause death or serious injury; and

  the crew possibly, but not certainly, lost consciousness in the seconds following Orbiter breakup due to in-flight loss of crew module pressure."

  This is all paraphrased in the above section in describing how much hinged on if the cabin remained pressurized, that the forces were insufficient to cause major injury, and that it is unknown whether the crew cabin remained pressurized. I'm not sure why you reverted the edit to leave this quote in and not remove the paraphrased material.

Agreed. As it stands, the summary, bulletpointed section seems to be completely redundant with what's in the immediately preceding body paragraph. --Neopeius (talk) 12:59, 1 November 2020 (UTC)

Sounds good; I will remove the bullet pointed section. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 08:46, 2 November 2020 (UTC)

*Overmyer

• "I not only flew with Dick Scobee, we owned a plane together"

  While an important fact about Scobee and Overmyer's personal life, this has no bearing on Scobee's survival.

  "and I know Scob did everything he could to save his crew. Scob fought for any and every edge to survive. He flew that ship without wings all the way down ... they were alive."

  All that is really stated here is that Overmyer believes that Scobee was alive and trying to fly the crew cabin, without providing any new evidence. I think it's fair to say that Overmyer believes this and should be paraphrased, but it doesn't necessitate using a direct quote. His exact wording isn't relevant to his conclusion. On a related note, Scobee's PEAP wasn't activated and he didn't have any switches moved on his panel, so he is the less-likely of the two pilot-astronauts to have tried to fly in the emergency.

Frankly, Overmeyer's unsupported assertions don't seem relevant at all. (Fun fact: Back when you could send a letter to NASA and they'd mail you a grab bag of glossy 8x11 photos, one of the ones I got (in the early 80s) was Scobee. I was a very disappointed kid; I didn't know who this guy was and wanted pictures of space ships and planets. Ironic how things turn out...) --Neopeius (talk) 12:59, 1 November 2020 (UTC)

I agree with you here that Overmeyer's assertions aren't relevant. That was my initial reaction, but I was worried that I was being too heavy-handed with its deletion. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 08:58, 2 November 2020 (UTC)

@Hawkeye7, Kees08, Soumya-8974, Neopeius, and Coffeeandcrumbs: to get further WP:SPACEFLIGHT input.

Looking forward to getting this sorted out. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 11:25, 1 November 2020 (UTC)

I prefer paraphrasing over direct quotation due to copyright concerns. --Soumya-8974 ^talk _contribs ^subpages 12:45, 1 November 2020 (UTC)

I worry less about copyright concerns when the quote is short and obviously separated by quotes. Then it's a quote, not a crib. But where I note above, the quotes simply aren't necessary, and Balon is right that we should follow the MOS guidance on this matter. :) --Neopeius (talk) 12:59, 1 November 2020 (UTC)

I have made the changes described above. Thank you @Soumya-8974 and Neopeius: for your inputs. Looking forward to moving forward from this section and begin improving the rest of the article. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 09:07, 2 November 2020 (UTC)

@Balon Greyjoy: can you, using strikethrough, strike out the resolved issues? --Neopeius (talk) 14:31, 2 November 2020 (UTC)

@Neopeius: Done, although I eliminated everything I had stated that I would, so now it just looks like one of my papers post-proofreading in high school (and grad school). Unrelated note, I never realized that {{ping}} can also be {{yo}}. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 08:55, 10 November 2020 (UTC)

Shortening/combining the Legacy section

The Legacy section is pretty exhaustive, and includes many of the schools/locations named in honor of the crew. It also seems to include every mention of the Challenger disaster in pop culture, no matter how minor or tangential. I am shortening the list of locations to just state that they exist, and removing pop culture references with the criteria that the disaster must be either a major focus of the material, or that there was significant public reaction (such as the case in Beyonce's sampling of the audio). Balon Greyjoy (talk) 10:25, 22 April 2021 (UTC)

Change infobox photo

I think the infobox photo should be changed from the photo collection to either the mission patch or the iconic photo of the explosion. My vote is for the latter. I think the other photos are important, but belong in their respective sections in the article. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 10:12, 22 April 2021 (UTC)

The current photo montage has a lot of photos in it, and appears quite busy. While all of them are relevant to the Challenger disaster in some way, I don't think they all the same amount of impact as the iconic photo taken soon after the explosion. I am changing the infobox photo to be only that photo. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 11:52, 19 July 2021 (UTC)

the GAO investigations and their relation to the U.S. house hearings

Extended content

Collapsed wall 'o text. WP:NPA. hello, i'm just putting this section here because it's obvious balon greyjoy has a non-neutral point of view. this is best shown in one of his responses to another section here: @Aeroview854: While that is a valid point, it's easier to look back on the disaster as a failure of politics, while at the time it was viewed as a safe option. While it subsequently came out that there were issues with the O-rings in the 24 preceding flights, the general understanding was that the multiple segment SRBs were a safe option. While the SRBs were redesigned after the disaster, and the cost-benefit of changing manufacturers mid-program can be debated, the engineers and safety personnel associated with the Space Shuttle continued to trust multi-segment SRBs for the rest of the program, and are doing so again on the SLS system. Obviously these people are not perfect and can make mistakes, but it seems difficult to fathom that they would stick with the multi-segment SRB if it is doomed to fail. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 15:49, 28 October 2020 (UTC) it is wrong for greyjoy to claim that "the general understanding was that multiple-segment SRBS were a safe option". this is simply not true. in fact, it was being argued at the time the original award was given (1973) that the solid rocket booster design was flawed. this is why the government accountability office stated that the award should be reconsidered. the GAO did this because when it evaluated the price competitiveness of the Lockheed and Thiokol proposals (found to be similar), they thought the differences in the design warranted reconsideration. In a December 12, 1973, report, NASA selection officials said Thiokol's "cost advantages were substantial and consistent throughout all areas evaluated." 7 They also singled out Thiokol's joint design for special mention. "The Thiokol motor case joints utilized dual O-rings and test ports between seals, enabling a simple leak check without pressurizing the entire motor," the officials' report said. "This innovative design feature increased reliability and decreased operations at the launch site, indicating good attention to low cost (design, development, testing and engineering) and production." 8 "We noted that the [NASA Source Selection] board's analysis of cost factors indicated that Thiokol could do a more economical job than any of the other proposers in both the development and the production phases of the program; and that, accordingly, the cost per flight to be expected from a Thiokol-built motor would be the lowest," the officials said. "We, therefore, concluded that any selection other than Thiokol would give rise to an additional cost of appreciable size." 9 — NASA indeed, the AP writing on this issue in 1986 states The report, released Monday, said it was ″an accident rooted in history″ that began with a poorly designed rocket joint, followed by the failure of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its contractors to recognize it as a problem, their failure to fix it and their conclusion it was an acceptable flight risk. — AP per this IEEE spectrum article, we learn a few things lockheed stressed that the solid rocket booster design would be a large risk the thiokol design was rated the worst among all proposals, finishing at 124/200 points. the GAO stated there was flawed reasoning for awarding thiokol the contracts (in this case they reference cost, but were aware of lockheed's concerns about safety) Fletcher was aware of the problems and chose to go with thiokol anyways. as late as 1977 there were concerns about the solid rocket booster technology. so mr greyjoy's claim that "SRBs were considered a safe option" was the reason they were awarded the contract, is demonstrably false. i am currently looking for the original 1973 GAO report, but certainly it does not seem this design was ever considered safe at the time it was issued. it's possible the GAO report does not mention safety since the cost-effectiveness of thiokol's proposal, which was the primary reason they were awarded the contract, should have been sufficient to compel NASA to reconsider lockheed. but as it is infamously known: NASA did not and it had disastrous consequences. essentially i'm gathering is that the cost effectiveness was SO attractive that NASA overlooked any potential safety concerns from their design. and even when the GAO recommended reconsideration on the primary basis of cost-effectiveness in their 1973 report, it seemingly was not enough to change things (looking for this report, still). as LATE as 1977, there were concerns about the design. mr greyjoy seems to baselessly revert as he is aware this information will get more exposure on this page, as opposed to the ones he's recommending (the manufacturer's page, for example). edit: i am in the process of tracking down the 1973 GAO report. per the esteemed book Challenger: a major malfunction this report is 98 pages. in my search of the GAO archives (from 1/1/1973 to 31/12/1974) i could not find such a report. dianne vaughn's book on this disaster claims the GAO announced the decision on 22 June 1974. broadening the search on the GAO archives to all released documents in that date range did not yield this report. i have formally made the request for this comprehensive study because i feel it probably did touch on the rocket design differences, but in the framework of the original scoring of the proposals. greyjoy poked the wrong bear 198.53.108.48 (talk) 21:09, 25 July 2021 (UTC) 198.53.108.48 (talk · contribs · WHOIS) Looking to clear up some of the confusion we have here between us. The main concern I have is the relevance of a 1973 investigation into why Thiokol was picked over other bidders when it comes to the actual Challenger disaster. I'm not disputing the possibility of favoritism on the part of Fletcher for selecting Thiokol, but this article is not about the details of how the Space Shuttle was designed and contracted out (as Space Shuttle design process is). Yes, the two-ring system was useful for leak checks, as noted by Fletcher, but also by McDonald and the Rogers Commission; there is nothing new added from the Fletcher quote. I'm also not disputing the safety of solid-rocket boosters, but it's not like Thiokol was the only company to propose an SRB design, so Thiokol's selection as a contractor wasn't the only reason the Space Shuttle had SRBs. As evidenced in other sources in this article, Thiokol and NASA both had unsafe practices that ultimately led to this disaster, and while it can be noted that there may have been some shady business practices in selecting Thiokol for SRB production and maintenance, it does not require a sub-section discussing a long-closed inconclusive investigation. This isn't in some effort to squash alternate theories or minimize their exposure, but rather to keep only information that falls under WP:SCOPE. Information shouldn't be on this page only because it will get more exposure than if it is on a less-viewed page. Additionally, I request that you follow WP:FOC when making these types of discussions. Debate is healthy, but accusations ("it's obvious balon greyjoy has a non-neutral point of view") and combative tone ("greyjoy poked the wrong bear") have no place here or the rest of Wikipedia; this isn't some competition for one of us to WP:WIN. Most disturbing is your edit summary that includes "bang bang, greyjoy's dead" from this diff. I have added the appropriate warning to your user talk page. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 07:19, 26 July 2021 (UTC) @Balon Greyjoy: there is no attack. the 'bang bang, greyjoy is dead' is a play on words from the song Kill Bill vol. 1. it was never intended to convey any kind of bodily harm, and i apologise if you interpreted it that way. i was merely conveying my confidence in the evidentiary basis supporting the idea the GAO report in 1973 was critical. i agree the page should focus on the disaster but i feel the first GAO report (i have requested it, i may have to call them to get confirmation) was so important and the dismissal of its recommendations was a direct cause of the disaster. the second one was less important but it is directly related to the blurb on the congressional investigation so i briefly touched on it by just stating their conclusion. i disagree that the first report was inconclusive. many of the sources i provide above support that claim. you may be right the second report was inconclusive, but again since it is relevant to the congressional hearings i thought it would be good to mention their conclusion. i also feel that you're underplaying certain aspects of what caused the disaster. you sound like a 'rocket buff', so i will not really contest whether there were other designs at that time since this area i find this area boring (no offence). what i did want to highlight is, it does not seem solid rocket boosters are the same as solid rocket motors. is that a fair claim? the link you're sharing suggests all contractors had solid rocket motor designs, but not so for the booster. the lockheed proposal seems to suggest the SRB design at that time would be risky. so i am at a loss as to how you can say they were considered safe. maybe in the general context, but not so in the context of the RFP? i think i called the wrong number yesterday. i found the right point of contact. mr timothy bowling, whom i've emailed. if i don't hear within two days i'll shoot him a call. IP, I collapsed the wall of text above; no one is going to read it. Please focus on content, not editors, and be concise. Regarding this proposed edit, an expose on Mormons doesn't seem like a very good source for a technical article. Any other sources that would establish whether this coverage meets WP:DUE? Calling the GAO does not meet our requirement for verifiability. VQuakr (talk) 22:57, 26 July 2021 (UTC) @VQuakr: it is your own fault if you did not read any of the sources i've provided. all of them corroborate exactly what the source says. you claim the book source isn't appropriate, but as the sources above show: it is clearly appropriate. i have reworked my insertion and used the sources provided in the arguments above, in addition to the original. Anson D. Schupe seems to be a pretty good author if he has a wikipedia page. nothing on his page suggests he is a conspiracy theorist. i should mention: to come in a discussion and simply say "no one is going to read that", revert someone's edits, after it seems both sides reached an agreement, is both rude and disingenuous. you shouldn't involve yourself in a discussion that two parties were in the process of solving. we were about to talk about the differences in rocket motors vs boosters and you just come in out of nowhere and stomp on everything. further, the GAO report is valid. all of the sources above are WP:secondary and sufficient for the edit to stay. the only reason i am asking for the original 1973 report is for my own information. the report itself is not required to dispute relevance which was the basis of the original reversion. the 1973 report would provide welcome insight as to what the GAO said exactly, in addition to the cost effectiveness angle. it has been alleged more than once NASA made a cost/safety decision — Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.53.108.48 (talk • contribs) Focus on content. I'm not the only editor to take issue with the proposed add, and the onus is on you to establish consensus for inclusion. This seems like coatracking to me; as proposed I don't think it should be included. The GAO investigation after the disaster was focused on a conflict of interest and is quite tangential to the subject of the incident itself. VQuakr (talk) 06:11, 27 July 2021 (UTC) 198.53.108.48 (talk · contribs · WHOIS) Couple points to address: As I mentioned above, I are not disputing the safety of these solid rocket boosters (which, for the purposes of this article, are the same as the solid rocket motors). I am also not disputing that Fletcher prioritized cost over safety. I am disputing the need for an entire sub-section about the GAO investigation from 1973, when the only detail relevant to the article is that the field joints were known to be unsafe long before the Challenger disaster. There is an entire sub-section going over O-ring concerns; this is where that detail belongs. I additionally don't see the need to go into the 1986 investigation about monetary benefits for Fletcher that had inconclusive results. Discussing Shupe's criticism of it at the end of the discussion give it WP:UNDUE weight. According to his Wikipedia page, Anson Shupe is a Scientology-associated sociologist. In line with VQuakr, I do not consider an expose on the Mormon church by him to be a reliable and unbiased sourced when it comes to discussing a Space Shuttle disaster. Please do not post the names of non-public citizens on this talk page. It is important to respect privacy. Per WP:CITEVAR, the current format for citing books on this page uses the {{rp}} citation style for books. It is concerning that you attempt to make VQuakr feel unwelcome on this talk page. Their opinion is no less valid than either of ours', and I welcome their input into this discussion. I do not consider this matter nearly solved, and it's good to have another perspective on a conflict. You wrote an edit summary that includes "vquakr comes in after the original reverter acquiesced to the addition" despite that not being the case. Please do not create edit summaries to make it seem like the discussion is resolved to discourage others from participating. I hope that clears some of this up; looking forward to getting past this WP:EDITWAR and on to improving the article. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 06:22, 27 July 2021 (UTC) @Balon Greyjoy: re Vquakr if others want to participate, fine, but often they just insert a colon below the last line and sign their text. this guy decided he wanted it to go a certain way, telling me "no one is going to read that". well, this is apparently an encyclopaedia. sometimes adding or building upon knowledge requires reading, often lots of it. i am not sure shupe is a scientology-associated scientist. i did see that though, and point taken. however it is quite telling the content of his book led me to sources that support everything he was saying. that is the important part, but okay let's leave shupe aside for a sec and deal with the main issue. i disagree with the idea the 1973 GAO report should be moved to another section. if you want to remove the 1986 congressional investigation and such, that's fine. what i feel you're missing is the GAO report serves as the first documented sign of problems. that is why i feel it deserves a section. the o-rings and joints are just one part of the concerns that were raised in 1973. what is important is how fletcher dealt with these concerns. he was given an opportunity to reconsider awarding the contract and he did not. this, in my view, is something you are overlooking. the conduct of fletcher in dealing with this report is also noteworthy. this is not political. the GAO report recommended a reconsideration, and the sources strongly support that fletcher adopted an attitude or position that was not defensible in light of the evidence put before him (especially the adjusted costs that made the proposals approximately equal). so the question is, how do both sides converge? as it relates to the citation style, i don't care. you can change that any way you'd like. an update: i have read the 1973 report in its entirety, it is nothing short of outstanding and a testament to what america can be. it addresses the every single concern raised by lockheed in great detail. before providing the noteworthy passages as they pertain to this discussion, i want to briefly mention that the approach taking by the source evaluation board was one that used costs as an overall measure. that is if corrections were needed to deficiencies, they were scored accordingly and then the costs to compensate were separately adjusted. here are the passages i feel are noteworthy: MISSION SUITABILITY THE SEB DESIGN TEAM HAD THE PRIMARY TASK OF REVIEWING EACH OFFEROR'S PROPOSAL FOR SUSPECTED DESIGN STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES AND THE ADDITIONAL TASK OF PROPOSING METHODS TO CORRECT ANY DEFICIENCIES FOUND. A DISTINCTION MUST, HOWEVER, BE DRAWN BETWEEN THESE FUNCTIONS. FIRST, EACH SPECIFIC DESIGN STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS, AND THE RELATIVE MAGNITUDE OF IT, WAS REPORTED BY THE DESIGN TEAM TO THE SEB AS AN AID IN NUMERICALLY SCORING THE PROPOSALS IN THE DESIGN AREA. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT NO SEB-CORRECTED DESIGN FEATURES WERE SUBMITTED TO THE SEB FOR SCORING SINCE ONLY THE PROPOSALS TOGETHER WITH THE DESIGN TEAM'S LISTING OF EACH PROPOSER'S INDEPENDENT DESIGN STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES WERE USED IN THE SEB DESIGN EVALUATION. FURTHERMORE, THE IMPACT OF THE DESIGN TEAM'S SECOND FUNCTION - DESIGN CORRECTION - WENT ULTIMATELY ONLY TO COST ADJUSTMENT - BOTH DIRECTLY (E.G., WHERE ADDITIONAL MATERIAL IS REQUIRED) AND INDIRECTLY (E.G., WHERE AN ADDITIONAL MANUFACTURING STEP IS REQUIRED TO EFFECT THE CHANGE INDICATED AS NECESSARY BY THE DESIGN TEAM). LOCKHEED'S CONTENTIONS re: MISSION SUITABILITY THE THIOKOL CASE DESIGN MET THE GENERAL SRM REQUIREMENTS; HOWEVER, THE CYLINDRICAL SEGMENT (FOR ALTERNATE WATER IMPACT LOADS) WAS CLOSE TO THE UPPER LIMITS OF SIZE CAPABILITY OF THE CASE FABRICATOR. THE NOZZLE DESIGN INCLUDED ABLATIVE MATERIALS NOT CURRENTLY DEVELOPED OR CHARACTERIZED. THIS OFFERED POTENTIAL SAVINGS IN PROGRAM COST, BUT WITH ATTENDANT TECHNICAL AND PROGRAM RISK. AN EXPANDED CHARACTERIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE THICKNESS OF THE NOZZLE MATERIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO MEET REQUIRED SAFETY FACTORS AND THUS DEGRADED RELIABILITY. THE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL REQUIRED TO CORRECT THE DEFICIENCY WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND THE DEFICIENCY COULD REQUIRE A REDESIGN OF THE METAL PORTIONS AS WELL AS THE ABLATIVE PORTIONS. THE DESIGN WAS COMPLEX AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO DIFFICULTY IN MANUFACTURING. THE THIOKOL MOTOR CASE JOINTS UTILIZED DUAL O-RINGS AND TEST PORTS BETWEEN SEALS, ENABLING A SIMPLE LEAK CHECK WITHOUT PRESSURIZING THE ENTIRE MOTOR. THIS INNOVATIVE DESIGN FEATURE INCREASED RELIABILITY AND DECREASED OPERATIONS AT THE LAUNCH SITE, INDICATING GOOD ATTENTION TO LOW COST DDT&E AND PRODUCTION. THE THICKNESS OF THE INTERNAL INSULATION IN THE CASE AFT DOME WAS MARGINAL AND CREATED A TECHNICAL RISK. SEB conclusions re: MISSION SUITABILITY PRECISELY, BOTH THE DESIGN TEAM AND THE SEB CHARACTERIZED THIOKOL'S LOW-COST MATERIAL AS A DESIGN WEAKNESS OF SOME IMPORT AND MADE A COST ADJUSTMENT FOR ADDITIONAL DEVELOPMENTAL TESTING DEEMED NECESSARY TO ALLOW FOR THE POSSIBLE USE OF THIS LOW-COST MATERIAL AND MADE ANOTHER ADJUSTMENT RELATIVE TO THE CONTINGENCY THAT ONLY CONVENTIONAL MATERIAL (A THIOKOL PROPOSED ALTERNATE APPROACH) COULD BE USED. THE INADEQUATE THICKNESS OF THIOKOL'S NOZZLE MATERIAL ALSO RESULTED IN AN EVALUATED WEAKNESS WITH COST IMPACT. FURTHERMORE, THIOKOL'S NOZZLE COMPLEXITY WAS ESTABLISHED AS A WEAKNESS BOTH IN DESIGN AND IN MANUFACTURING AS THE THIOKOL NOZZLE DESIGN WAS CONSIDERED TO BE ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT OF THE NOZZLES PROPOSED TO MANUFACTURE. AN ADJUSTMENT TO THE APPROPRIATE THIOKOL LEARNING CURVE WAS MADE BY THE SEB TO MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT THIS DIFFICULTY OF MANUFACTURING THE THIOKOL NOZZLE. OF COURSE, THIS ADJUSTMENT TO THE THIOKOL LEARNING CURVE HAD THE ADDITIONAL EFFECT OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF MAN-HOURS REQUIRED TO MANUFACTURE THE NOZZLE AND HENCE THE COST OF MANUFACTURE. GAO conclusion re: MISSION SUITABILITY THE SEB GAVE THIOKOL'S PROPOSAL WEAKNESSES BOTH IN DESIGN AND IN MANUFACTURING BECAUSE ITS COMPLEX NOZZLE CONTAINED A LARGE NUMBER OF PARTS WHICH WOULD NOT LEND ITSELF TO EASY FABRICATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, FOR ITS SUBMISSION OF AN UNMANUFACTURABLE ALTERNATE CASE, THIOKOL WAS GIVEN A DEFICIENCY ONLY IN MANUFACTURING FOR ITS RESPONSE TO THE ALTERNATE WATER IMPACT LOAD. SINCE THE FAILURE TO SUBMIT A READILY PRODUCIBLE END PRODUCT IS LIKEWISE A DESIGN ERROR WHICH LEADS TO PROBLEMS IN MANUFACTURING, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SEB, CONSISTENT WITH ITS EVALUATION OF NOZZLE COMPLEXITY, SHOULD HAVE ASSESSED THIOKOL WITH AN ADDITIONAL WEAKNESS IN DESIGN. WE NOTE THAT, IN ANOTHER AREA, THIOKOL WAS ASSESSED FAVORABLY IN BOTH DESIGN AND PRODUCT SUPPORT FOR ITS PROPOSED USE OF A CERTAIN TYPE AND DESIGN OF CASE SEGMENT SEALS. CONSISTENCY WOULD SEEM TO REQUIRE THAT DESIGN DETAILS WHICH IMPACT ON MANUFACTURING, REFURBISHMENT AND/OR PRODUCT SUPPORT SHOULD BE REFLECTED, EITHER AS STRENGTHS OR WEAKNESSES, OR BOTH, IN DESIGN AND IN THE OTHER AREAS AFFECTED. WE THEREFORE QUESTION THE SEB'S FAILURE TO ASSESS THIOKOL A WEAKNESS RELATIVE TO ALTERNATE CASE DESIGN. MOREOVER, WHERE THE DESIGN TEAM HAS RECOGNIZED AS A WEAKNESS THE FACT THAT THIOKOL PROPOSED THE USE OF A CERTAIN TYPE OF METAL FOR PARTS OF THE NOZZLE WHICH COULD HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE REFURBISHABILITY OF THESE PARTS, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT A CONCURRENT NOTATION OF WEAKNESS WOULD ALSO BECOME NECESSARY IN REFURBISHMENT. overall the report is superb. i feel the GAO kind of pussyfoots around certain things because they're supposed to be impartial. however the main point is concerns over design were raised. the GAO sheepishly stated that the costs were adjusted and the points were deducted, reflecting the overall utility-theoretic approach, but this did not truly put safety at the forefront. i feel the most "crushing" part of the lockheed proposal was their insistence on having new facilities for the ammonium perchlorate, which did necessitate some higher upfront costs, but are we talking about safety, or costs? the GAO does state NASA warned lockheed that higher upfront costs would be seen as unfavourable on three separate seminars prior to the RFP. however it is tragic that lockheed was right and this entire situation was actually over costs instead of a true consideration of safety. costs are the clear concern throughout the GAO report as well. the skinny: the overall theme coming from the GAO report was that NASA chose to romanticise the Thiokol proposal because lockheed had been told that higher starting costs would hurt their proposal (three separate times). this is not about safety, but about fitting things within a budget. even with all of that said, the costs were determined to be approximately equal and NASA still chose the riskier option. to me this feels like it was due to the higher starting costs that are emphasised throughout the report to build the perchlorate facilities. i'm open to others' view on this report. i do feel it should be cited in the main article. it is very good. i was actually impressed, and that's very hard to do these days (to many people's chagrin). 198.53.108.48 (talk) As far as I can tell, all this report tells us based upon the SEB/GAO conclusions is that Thiokol underestimated its program costs when submitting a bid, and there was concern over why they were selected despite it being obvious that their projected costs were not in line with reality. While this is a part of the history of the SRB and Space Shuttle, this GAO report is not some sort of smoking gun that reveals Thiokol was on the road to disaster in 1973. Allan McDonald's book and the Rogers Commission are not shy about pointing fingers at Morton-Thiokol, and they are hardly saints in this narrative, but this GAO report does not add to or change the story of the design defects that caused the Challenger disaster. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 06:30, 28 July 2021 (UTC) by in large, i agree with your interpretation of the report. however what i do think you're omitting are the following facts we agree the GAO does focus on the costs and concluded both lockheed and thiokol's proposals fell within a margin that considered their costs equal. we will likely both agree this is one of the main reasons for the recommendation to reconsider the award we agree that the report does not act as a 'smoking gun' regarding thiokol and whether they were on the road to disaster. however the conduct of the SSO is what should be of focus here, which i think is what warrants its own section (and sorry to belabour this point) the SSO (fletcher) originally chose thiokol due to their cost effectiveness. the GAO report states they were less-experienced, but also said that lockheed had no advantage because the deliverables had never been manufactured: LOCKHEED MAINTAINS THAT THIOKOL LACKS EXPERIENCE IN FABRICATING NOZZLES, PARTICULARLY NOZZLES OF THE SIZE AND QUANTITY NECESSARY TO SATISFY THE PRODUCT OR REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONTRACT. LOCKHEED CONTRASTS THE THIOKOL LIMITED EXPERIENCE TO THE EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE OF SEVERAL QUALIFIED VENDORS ON PRODUCTION PROGRAMS AND ON LARGE DEVELOPMENT NOZZLES. WE QUESTIONED NASA AND THIOKOL ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THIOKOL AND OTHER FABRICATORS HAVE EXPERTISE IN NOZZLE PRODUCTION. WE ALSO EXAMINED THIOKOL'S PROPOSAL AND THE SEB RECORDS. WE CONCLUDE THAT NO NOZZLE MANUFACTURER HAS FABRICATED NOZZLES IN A PRODUCTION PROGRAM IN ANY WAY COMPARABLE TO THE SIZE, TYPE, AND QUANTITY REQUIRED FOR THE SRM. THIS OBSERVATION IS SUPPORTED BY THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE FROM A LETTER OF MAY 13, 1974, TO LOCKHEED FROM A QUALIFIED NOZZLE VENDOR STATING IN PART: SINCE A NOZZLE PRODUCTION PROGRAM COMPARABLE TO THE SRM IN SIZE, COMPLEXITY, DURATION, AND DELIVERY REQUIREMENTS HAS NOT BEEN ACCOMPLISHED TO DATE, ACTUAL COST CURVE DATA IS NOT AVAILABLE. THEREFORE, IT APPEARS THAT WHICHEVER "EXPERIENCED" NOZZLE FABRICATOR WOULD PRODUCE THE NOZZLE, SOME DEVELOPMENT OF NEW EXPERTISE AND A NEW EXPERIENCE BASE WOULD BE REQUIRED. A REVIEW OF THIOKOL'S PROPOSAL, THE SEB RECORDS, AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY DATA SUBMITTED SUPPORTS THE SEB'S CONCLUSION THAT THIOKOL POSSESSES BASIC EXPERTISE AND EXPERIENCE IN THE FABRICATION OF NOZZLES. WE ARE PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY THIOKOL'S (1) FABRICATION EXPERIENCE WITH FLEXIBLE BEARINGS - A KEY COMPONENT IN THE SRM NOZZLE; (2) EXTENSIVE NOZZLE DESIGN PARTICIPATION; (3) MANUFACTURE OF VARIOUS SMALL NOZZLES AND PLASTIC NOZZLES; AND (4) EXPERIENCE IN POSEIDON AND TRIDENT TEST NOZZLES, AS WELL AS ANTICIPATED PRODUCTION FOLLOW-ON CONTRACTS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE SRM NOZZLES ARE SCHEDULED FOR FABRICATION. IN VIEW THEREOF, WE FIND A REASONABLE APPLICATION OF JUDGMENT BY THE SEB IN TREATING THIOKOL'S NOZZLE SIZE EXPERIENCE AS ONLY A MINOR WEAKNESS IN MANUFACTURING. WHILE SOME VENDORS MIGHT HAVE MORE PRODUCTION EXPERIENCE WITH NOZZLES LARGER THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY MANUFACTURED BY THIOKOL, WE CANNOT SAY THAT NOZZLE FABRICATION BY THIOKOL WOULD REPRESENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW EXPERTISE. IN ANY EVENT, THE RFP DID NOT PROHIBIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW EXPERTISE, BUT PROVIDED THAT NEW EXPERTISE "IS TO BE AVOIDED TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE." THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT THIOKOL'S DECISION TO FABRICATE THE NOZZLE IN-HOUSE DID NOT DEVIATE FROM ANY RFP REQUIREMENT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE CREDIT GIVEN FOR THIS COST-SAVING DECISION BY THE SEB IN MANAGEMENT EVALUATION APPEARS PROPER. IN ANY EVENT, THE SEB RECORDS REVEAL THAT THE THIOKOL NOZZLE DECISION, WHILE RATED A MANAGEMENT STRENGTH, WAS NOT AMONG THE PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR THIOKOL'S SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE ATTAINED IN THE MANAGEMENT EVALUATION. as i said, i agree with you there is no smoking gun. however it is quite telling the GAO evaluated the possibility of requiring 'new expertise' did not deviate from the RFP requirements, but this was to be avoided. this strengthens my view that, while this is not a smoking gun, it strongly showed thiokol was not in a position to reliably produce what was being proposed. the SSO was informed by the GAO the proposal fell within some range that allowed their costs to be considered equal the SSO, in light of thiokol's proposed cost-effectiveness being negated and the fact they had to develop 'new expertise', upheld his original decision. the SSO upheld his original decision and opted for the inferior proposal from a less-experienced manufacturer i therefore stand by my original argument of why this report deserves its own section, concurring with you in part about this report not being a 'smoking gun'. the SSO's response to the report is what makes it so. why would you select the inferior candidate when the costs were determined as equal (upfront perchlorate plant costs from lockheed withstanding)? makes no sense. anyways i want to integrate some of the meat from this GAO report into the blurb. how do you recommend i do this without creating large chunks of text in the body of the article? i feel the passages i'm sharing above are very helpful and maybe a few of them can help readers if they want to check footnotes. see how productive this conversation became/is becoming?198.53.108.48 (talk) 17:31, 28 July 2021 (UTC) As I have stated previously, this is relevant information on pages such as the Space Shuttle design process and Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster, but not the Challenger disaster page. This page is not here to explain the decisions made during Space Shuttle program unless they pertain directly to the accident. O-ring degradation is relevant to the disaster, but a critique of the use of SRBs and awarding contracts to Thiokol is not within the WP:SCOPE of this article. In the same way, the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster article should discuss what damaged the thermal protection system, but it is not a critique of the decision to use the TPS on a spaceplane rather than an ablative heat shield on a capsule design. I'm happy to give you feedback on incorporating this information into other articles, but my opinion that the GAO report is outside of the scope of this article has not changed. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 07:40, 29 July 2021 (UTC) I agree with Balon Greyjoy. The relevance of this material to this article hasn't been established. IP, please also see WP:VNOT: there is no obligation to include this material here. VQuakr (talk) 15:04, 29 July 2021 (UTC) there is no applicability of WP:VNOT here, @VQuakr:. the entirety of the content is sourced by reliable material. the question isn't about verifiability. just stay out of this and let him and i work this out. we don't need your involvement with vacuous invocations of WP: rules. as it stands, this is not about verifiability. in fact, it shows just how uninvolved you are in this discussion. butt out, we'll figure it out. @Balon Greyjoy: what you're claiming isn't consistent with the material of the article though. the investigations are relevant because they pertain to the disaster, right? then, the 1986 GAO report is relevant on the basis it was ordered out of this congressional investigation right? i mean, it is the basis that congress relied upon. maybe not in its own section, but i am sure it is of use somewhere. in terms of the 1973 GAO report. okay, i understand what you're saying in terms of the tendering process not being relevant since there is no direct relationship to the disaster. however you say the O-ring degradation is relevant, right? then, per the GAO report: LOCKHEED ASSERTS THAT THE SSO'S SELECTION STATEMENT ESTABLISHES THAT THE THIOKOL DESIGN DEFICIENCIES WERE MAJOR AND NOT READILY CORRECTABLE. THE PERTINENT PORTION OF THE STATEMENT SAYS: THE THIOKOL CASE DESIGN MET THE GENERAL SRM REQUIREMENTS; HOWEVER, THE CYLINDRICAL SEGMENT (FOR ALTERNATE WATER IMPACT LOADS) WAS CLOSE TO THE UPPER LIMITS OF SIZE CAPABILITY OF THE CASE FABRICATOR. THE NOZZLE DESIGN INCLUDED ABLATIVE MATERIALS NOT CURRENTLY DEVELOPED OR CHARACTERIZED. THIS OFFERED POTENTIAL SAVINGS IN PROGRAM COST, BUT WITH ATTENDANT TECHNICAL AND PROGRAM RISK. AN EXPANDED CHARACTERIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE THICKNESS OF THE NOZZLE MATERIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO MEET REQUIRED SAFETY FACTORS AND THUS DEGRADED RELIABILITY. THE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL REQUIRED TO CORRECT THE DEFICIENCY WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND THE DEFICIENCY COULD REQUIRE A REDESIGN OF THE METAL PORTIONS AS WELL AS THE ABLATIVE PORTIONS. THE DESIGN WAS COMPLEX AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO DIFFICULTY IN MANUFACTURING. THE THIOKOL MOTOR CASE JOINTS UTILIZED DUAL O-RINGS AND TEST PORTS BETWEEN SEALS, ENABLING A SIMPLE LEAK CHECK WITHOUT PRESSURIZING THE ENTIRE MOTOR. THIS INNOVATIVE DESIGN FEATURE INCREASED RELIABILITY AND DECREASED OPERATIONS AT THE LAUNCH SITE, INDICATING GOOD ATTENTION TO LOW COST DDT&E AND PRODUCTION. THE THICKNESS OF THE INTERNAL INSULATION IN THE CASE AFT DOME WAS MARGINAL AND CREATED A TECHNICAL RISK. so lockheed did assert the exact point of failure that caused the disaster would be a risk, further IT IS TRUE, AS NOTED BY THE SSO, THE SEB AND THE DESIGN TEAM, THAT THERE WERE DEFICIENCIES IN THE THIOKOL DESIGN. NEVERTHELESS, WE DO NOT FEEL THAT THE THIOKOL PROPOSAL CONTAINED MAJOR DESIGN DEFICIENCIES. PURSUANT TO THE SENSE OF THE SOURCE EVALUATION PLAN, MAJOR DESIGN DEFICIENCIES ENVISAGE ONLY THOSE WEAKNESSES WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE SRM'S ABILITY TO PERFORM ACCEPTABLY WITHIN THE RFP PARAMETERS AND ARE NOT WITHIN, OR ARE MARGINALLY WITHIN, THE PROPOSER'S CAPABILITY TO CORRECT IN A TIME FRAME CONSISTENT WITH PROJECT MILESTONES. DEFICIENCIES OF THE MAGNITUDE NOTED ABOVE CLEARLY ARE NOT READILY CORRECTABLE BY THE PROPOSER AND MAY NOT BE CORRECTABLE. ACCORDINGLY, ANY PROJECTION OF CORRECTION COST OF A MAJOR DESIGN DEFICIENCY WOULD BE AN EXERCISE IN UNCERTAINTY, WITH A RESULTING DEGRADATION OF THE VIABILITY OF THE ENTIRE EVALUATION PROCESS. ADDITIONALLY, A MAJOR DESIGN DEFICIENCY WOULD CLEARLY IMPLY THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF AN INPUT OF NASA EXPERTISE, THE PROPOSER COULD NOT READILY MODIFY ITS DESIGN SO AS TO HAVE IT CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE. WHILE WE NOTE THE IMPACT OF BOTH THE QUANTITY AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIOKOL'S DESIGN DEFICIENCIES, WE DO NOT FEEL THAT ANY SINGLE DEFICIENCY, OR EVEN THE WEAKNESSES TAKEN AS A WHOLE, CAN FAIRLY BE CATEGORIZED AS MAJOR DESIGN DEFICIENCIES SO AS TO CAST DOUBT ON THE PROPRIETY OF THE SEB DESIGN EVALUATING CORRECTION PROCESS. WE AGREE WITH LOCKHEED THAT "IT IS IMPROBABLE THAT NASA COULD HAVE SELECTED A PROPOSAL PER SE WITH MAJOR TECHNICAL WEAKNESSES ***" AND WE CONCLUDE THAT NASA DID NOT DO SO. thus, we see the GAO deferred to the SEB evaluation, even though it agreed the deficiencies pointed out by lockheed did exist. it refrained from 'casting doubt on the proprietary of the seb design evaluating correction process', in spite of the deficiencies that were agreed to exist. this is directly related to the accident. here, lockheed's complaint directly relates to what led to the failure the GAO opted to pussyfoot around the reality of what lockheed was alleging (which turned out to be 100% correct). even if we want to assume that the original SEB assessment thought this deficiency was correctable (we'll see if the FOIP for the documents is cheap, but i want the full breakdown of each category), then it is still relevant because the cause of the disaster was acknowledged as a weakness in the tendering process. can you explain how the cause of the disaster (o-rings), which was acknowldged as a deficiency by the SEB (and further alleged to be a major design flaw by lockheed), is not relevant when the report addresses it? 198.53.108.48 (talk) 17:42, 29 July 2021 (UTC) WP:VNOT stands for "Verifiability does not guarantee inclusion". Verifiability was not the point; relevance is. You do not get to decide who is involved in a discussion. The GAO quotes you note above refer to program risk (such as cost and schedule overruns), not risk of catastrophic failure during a launch. This is intuitive since the GAO would not specialize in technical review. '73 The GAO report, as you quote above, actually notes the o-ring system as a feature, not a risk to safety. Your synthesis about whether the GAO should have interpreted Lockheed's concerns differently isn't relevant. The '86 report is tangentially related to the disaster, to the extent that it probably wouldn't have been written if the disaster had not occurred. But its focus was not on the disaster and the relevance doesn't work backwards, so it does not warrant mention in this article. VQuakr (talk) 18:32, 29 July 2021 (UTC) 198.53.108.48 (talk · contribs · WHOIS) Couple points from me: As I've stated before, it is troubling that you are stating that VQuakr should not be participating in this discussion. Using phrases like "just stay out of this and let him and i work this out", "we don't need your involvement with vacuous invocations of WP", and "butt out, we'll figure it out" are not terms to encourage multiple parties to participate. Oftentimes, having third parties weigh in on a discussion is the only way a situation gets resolved when the original two parties are unable to come to an agreement, which I would say is the case for this situation. While it can sometimes feel that editors throw around around random references to Wikipedia and Manual of Style pages, that doesn't mean they can be written off as nonsensical argument. I think that WP:VNOT is applicable here; there is no argument against the verifiability of the GAO reports, but the discussion is about the inclusion in this article. I think VQuakr has stated my position better than I could, so I won't restate their comments, but I agree with them. I consider this matter settled for the time being. We have each discussed our own positions, and received outside input to help achieve consensus. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 07:20, 30 July 2021 (UTC) @VQuakr: nice to see something substantive come from you, for once. you state: "The GAO quotes you note above refer to program risk (such as cost and schedule overruns), not risk of catastrophic failure during a launch. This is intuitive since the GAO would not specialize in technical review" and "Your synthesis about whether the GAO should have interpreted Lockheed's concerns differently isn't relevant." does it matter who issues the warning? i agree the GAO does not specialise in technical review. however the design was rated as 124/200 points, the worst of all applicants. how does that not factor into the discussion here? the GAO recommended a reconsideration after finding the cost differences between proposals was overstated, and i just can't see how fletcher's choice to stick with thiokol (rated the worst design) did not contribute to the disaster. can you explain how this is synthesis now? the lowest-scoring design got the award in spite of negligible cost differences? certainly you can make the argument the SSO did not fully consider awarding the contract to the proposal with a much stronger design score. 198.53.108.48 (talk) 17:38, 30 July 2021 (UTC) Stop needling. Again, GAO's rating was addressing program risk, not concern that the concept was dangerous. Nothing relevant to the subject of this article has been presented, and your linking the two of them is an original synthesis that we can't use in the article. VQuakr (talk) 18:38, 30 July 2021 (UTC) @VQuakr: the rating is from the SEB and not the GAO, but your point is unchanged. however, i am not clear why the safety warning in lockheed's complaint is not relevant. is it because the GAO, in their deference to the SEB, did not agree? 198.53.108.48 (talk) 18:47, 30 July 2021 (UTC) You quoted Lockheed's concern with the Thiokol nozzle design above, but the SRB nozzles were not a factor in the Challenger disaster. If Lockheed communicated a safety concern specific to o-rings, can you please provide (/re-provide) a link? VQuakr (talk) 19:28, 30 July 2021 (UTC) @VQuakr: no, i cannot at this time. i am waiting for the GAO to get back to my FOIA request so i am able to read the entire lockheed complaint. if that complaint does mention this, would the relevance be established? i assume so? 198.53.108.48 (talk) 19:36, 30 July 2021 (UTC) The specific proposed edit (in the "Investigation" section) still wouldn't work since anything before 1986 still isn't relevant to that section. It might warrant mention in the Safety concerns-Solid Rocket Booster O-rings section since that discusses the prelude to the disaster. Hard to be precise without seeing the source. VQuakr (talk) 19:49, 30 July 2021 (UTC) @VQuakr: i'm okay with losing the 1986 stuff, i understand what you're saying there. it's kind of included in the congressional investigation bit anyways, but at least i have direction on what we need. it could be that the lockheed complaint has nothing further concerning safety (i believe aerojet was alleging safety issues as well), but given how the GAO quoted only certain passages it's not out of the realm of possibility that others did raise this concern. really excited the GAO is pulling everything. i hope if it's expensive there's some kind of slush fund they can tap for documents deemed to be 'in the public interest'. i wouldn't be surprised if this is the first time everything surrounding the decision has been requested. it'd take 25 years after 1973 for any requestor to have a remote chance at unredacted documents. asking for them nearly 50 years later makes it a near-certainty that there is no sensitive/proprietary technology because of patent expiration, thereby implying any redactions would be to protect identities of employees and the likes. i'm actually excited now. and i agree, we'd have to read what's there. but i'm fairly confident no book covering this matter has gone farther than the GAO reports just due to the patents. 198.53.108.48 (talk) 20:01, 30 July 2021 (UTC) @VQuakr: update on PRI-21-182 at the GAO: i was told today by Information Disclosure Specialist (Supervisor) that there are no documents on file. i have asked for confirmation that the physical archives have been inspected as well, given the substantial evidence stating the GAO possessed these documents at one time. i have also asked for additional information about the absence of these documents. specifically if there is any record of their deletion because it is very strange they do not even have the original complaint on file. i think they'll get back to me when they have the answer. anyways, when i was speaking to them about this unusual absence of documentation, i have found possibly a better source to support the claim. it turns out that, while i may be the first to formally file the FOIA for this information at the GAO (i think), the NYTIMES did something similar in 86 and found the golden nugget or "smoking gun" that was requested. "A rival company, worried about astronaut safety, in 1973 specifically warned that integrity of the O ring is largely a matter of faith. Thirteen years later, it was the rubbery O-shaped seals that failed between segments of a Thiokol booster, triggering the Challenger disaster." i will also note that this article again references the same thing that you were deriding the Shupe source for: an inexplicable favouritism overwhelmingly suggestive of cult connections that resulted in the loss of lives. of course i won't be mentioning this in the inserted text, but it is something that should be considered worth mentioning. 198.53.108.48 (talk) 17:56, 5 August 2021 (UTC) I'll wait for another opinion on this matter, but I don't think this NY Times articles has changed anything regarding the inclusion of the GAO report in this article. The NY Times article is from after the Challenger disaster, and its point is that Lockheed stated that the O-rings were a drawback for the Morton-Thiokol design, which we have already discussed in this talk page. The disaster certainly highlighted the SRB contract and would likely inspire journalists looking into the contract awarding process, but it is not like Lockheed was predicting the disaster. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 18:59, 5 August 2021 (UTC) The GAO aspect of this isn't relevant to this article, and we already have a section that would comfortably accommodate a sentence on the 1973 concerns: Safety concerns/Solid Rocket Booster O-rings regarding Aerojet's concerns. This or this might be better sources for more detailed information than is contained in the NYT article, but it is reg walled. I can request a copy if no one here has an IEEE account. VQuakr (talk) 19:11, 5 August 2021 (UTC) uh, the 1973 concern was voiced in response to the GAO investigation. there was no other avenue for this to come to light. time to go to dispute resolution because you have moved the goalposts. where are you getting the idea that a competitor could voice this issue in writing after the process has completed? the only way to do so is to launch a complaint to the GAO about the RFP. you cannot go to NASA about this. 198.53.108.48 i would like to add a new point about safety which i've emphasised throughout my responses above: the idea that safety was overlooked at the expense of cost-effectiveness. here is a philadelphia inquirer article where fletcher states: "Safety was never mentioned," he said. "In retrospect, I probably should have asked more questions." i want to relate this to the above discussion in the sense that, both @VQuakr and Balon Greyjoy: have emphasised the importance of not using retrospect, with which i agree. at the same time, is it acceptable to just assume all of the proposals met the requisite safety expectations when competitors were expressing reservations over different aspects of the design? we have aerojet stating issues with the o-rings, calling their reliability "largely a matter of faith" and we have lockheed concerned about the nozzle design that the SEB evaluation admitted needed a redesign. at what point can the GAO report be ignored? it overturned the original decision on the base of cost effectiveness (not safety), but as VQuakr stated: since it did not perform a technical review, it trusted the SEB and NASA for those aspects. The GAO found the proposal costs were deemed within a margin by the GAO, thereby negating the strongest argument for considering the thiokol contract. this, to me, with their recapitulation of many problems outlined by the competitors, is enough to establish relevance because fletcher was asked to reconsider the award, but he did not at the time fletcher had the choice to change the award, he was aware of the concerns by lockheed and aerojet. he was aware the lockheed and thiokol proposals fell within the same reason for cost. but he refused to reconsider. why is this not relevant to the disaster? there were enough concerns raised by other competitors that it certainly gave him an opportunity to change that course. even if the reconsideration of the reward was not based on safety, there was evidence before him about safety concerns and the costs were deemed equal. it was a decision point that deserved more care, and that is why it is relevant and worth mentioning. (talk) 19:43, 5 August 2021 (UTC)

I have a copy of those IEEE articles now, not sure if you have full text yet. Feel free to email me for a copy. Aerojet argued safety as a factor for their field joint-free design, but the other three competitors all had field joints. Field joints are and were quite common on large SRBs so this strikes me as more marketing from Aerojet than a real argument that their design was the only safe option. GAO recommended overturning (again, based on economics not safety and not to Aerojet); it didn't have the authority to actually change the award. The decision to stick with Thiokol might have slightly affected the long-term economics of the shuttle program, but it didn't automatically doom Challenger. Lockheed's nozzle design concerns are completely irrelevant to this article since nozzles had nothing to do with the disaster. Of course in retrospect we know M-T's design was not at all safe, but if there was a "smoking gun" clear back in the proposal stage I haven't seen it. Management's willingness to ignore their engineers in the years leading up to the disaster are a matter of record, but the redesign of the field joints wasn't terribly difficult relative to the scope of the shuttle program (it just took a catastrophic failure for them to take it seriously). Put another way, the existence of Redesigned Solid Rocket Motors and their record without further problems suggest that there wouldn't have been disqualifying technical issues in the original proposal.

Tangential question - any concerns with [1]? VQuakr (talk) 07:07, 6 August 2021 (UTC)

Well done, VQuakr! Balon Greyjoy (talk) 08:48, 6 August 2021 (UTC)

@VQuakr:

• did the competitors' segmented rocket booster designs also use seals? if so, could you please at least provide proof that lockheed's segmented design used seals?

i think it is WP:SYNTHESIS to state aerojet's concerns are promotional rather than genuine.

for me to accept this line of thinking i would need to see some evidence of other competitors' designs using seals to legitimise your marketing argument.

• i disagree again with how you are looking at the GAO report.

yes, i agree it is not technical.

yes, it recommended reconsideration on the basis of cost-effectiveness.

but, what we know is at the time this report was issued was two separate competitors pointed out concerns with another competitor's design.

we also know fletcher just assumed every proposal would be safe, in his own words he admits that he should have thought more about safety in general at the time.

• my point of view on the GAO report is this: without retrospect, there were two separate issues pointed out by two different competitors against the same company (M-T)

it is not the cost equivalence that is important per-se, it is the fact that fletcher had an opportunity to reconsider changing the for whatever reason.

cost-effectiveness was merely the reason that allowed the recommendation for reconsideration.

that does not, in any way, preclude fletcher from reconsidering the award on other or additional merits outside of the cost.

this is where i feel the safety concerns raised by two other competitors, in addition to the original argument for cost-effectiveness being overturned by the GAO, were sufficient to show that fletcher bears some culpability.

• in summary about the GAO report

you are saying it did not relate to the disaster.

i am saying it negated the main argument for M-T (cost-effectiveness), and brought to light two separate concerns about the design from two other competitors.

i agree that, at this point, the GAO did not assess the technical merits of these concerns at that time.

but to dismiss these concerns (one as marketing, the other as not having a factor in the outcome) is with the benefit of hindsight

• another question i have about your marketing argument is: how would one competitor be able to see the proposal of another before submission?

the way i understand the RFP process (i know they vary, i've done a few) is that all bidders submit their proposal by some deadline.

i can't see how it would be permitted for one bidder to inspect another bidder's proposal before submitting their own.

that seems to fly in the face of fairness, especially if one submits earlier than another.

in short: i need to see evidence of two things for the marketing argument

1. that, at the very least, lockheed used seals for the segmented rocket booster design, and
2. other bidders were able to inspect eachother's bid prior to submission, establishing knowledge of eachothers' design.

alternative evidence i would accept for 2 is a few reliable sources that would establish some kind of public knowledge that each company had a 'known design' that could be critiqued by others.

if you can produce 1+2 then i can see how the GAO report is less relevant. as a decision-point, however, with the material fletcher had available to him (and not using hindsight), i believe he should have fully exercised the opportunity to change the award.

References used by IP user

Please thread properly, this is prose not poetry and I find trying to follow your writing when it is broken up this way exhausting. I'll reply after you've fixed it. VQuakr (talk) 22:35, 6 August 2021 (UTC)

@VQuakr: what do you want me to do, exactly? make it, like, 3 paragraphs?

198.53.108.48 (talk · contribs · WHOIS) It would be appropriate if your responses are organized in paragraph form. Lists are not unacceptable and have their uses, but having a separate double-spaced line for each sentence is cumbersome to read and follow along with. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 07:53, 9 August 2021 (UTC)

It looks like the matter has been settled, although unfortunately it culminated in the IP user getting themselves blocked after making personal attacks. I would like to thank VQuakr, Robert McClenon, and Acroterion for their patience, responsiveness, and maturity throughout this extended process. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 06:56, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

User:Balon Greyjoy - I didn't do much other than being distrustful of the IP user because their edit summaries contained trolling, and telling them to use a registered account, which it turns out that they had, and then they hanged themselves with enough rope .... Robert McClenon (talk) 19:19, 13 August 2021 (UTC)

GA Review

This review is transcluded from Talk:Space Shuttle Challenger disaster/GA1. The edit link for this section can be used to add comments to the review.

Reviewer: Kusma (talk · contribs) 12:50, 14 September 2021 (UTC)

Would like to take this one. Expect comments over the next few days. —Kusma (talk) 12:50, 14 September 2021 (UTC)

Excellent. Looking forward to getting this article to GA/FA! Balon Greyjoy (talk) 16:00, 14 September 2021 (UTC)

It's a wonderful topic for a GA/FA, and a very informative article (my previous knowledge comes from reading Feynman's memories plus vague childhood memories of seeing it on TV). If you're aiming for FA, if you don't mind then I'm going to be a bit more thorough in my reading and perhaps suggest more changes than strictly necessary to get to GA level. As the article was previously a FA, I think it can be helpful to look at the 2006 version for inspiration every now and then. —Kusma (talk) 22:39, 14 September 2021 (UTC)

I appreciate any feedback you can give; more work for the GAN (hopefully) means less work on the FAC! I was born a few years afterwards, so the Columbia disaster (my next project) is the major space event I remember from my childhood. Getting Space Shuttle to FA made me learn more about the spacecraft and disaster, as my previous knowledge about the disaster was simply that the cold caused an O-ring to shrink and a subsequent explosion. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 11:59, 15 September 2021 (UTC)

My first space memories really are of my childhood hero, Ulf Merbold (that article needs some TLC too). —Kusma (talk) 10:39, 16 September 2021 (UTC)

Progress template

Good Article review progress box Criteria: 1a. prose () 1b. MoS () 2a. ref layout () 2b. cites WP:RS () 2c. no WP:OR () 2d. no WP:CV () 3a. broadness () 3b. focus () 4. neutral () 5. stable () 6a. free or tagged images () 6b. pics relevant () Note: this represents where the article stands relative to the Good Article criteria. Criteria marked are unassessed

Comments on criteria

Starting with easier comments, more when I get there.

• Images: Lots of great free images (thanks, NASA). File:Brumidi Challenger.jpg might cause you problems at FAC but I am not an expert. Captions are fine, with the possible exception of the one in the infobox. The 2006 version's was better. "Smoke plume of Challenger after its breakup" or so would be an improvement. It would be desirable to have a better picture of the Rogers commission (there are some great pictures of them all together, or of Feynman with the ice water, but I couldn't find anything free) but we just don't have one. Is there a source for the identification of the blob on File:Challenger breakup cabin.jpg as the cabin?
  • Good changes, won't insist on the main caption.
• Stable: Can't see any back-and-forth editing; your pruning seems to have met little resistance.

  There was a bit of a back and forth in October/November 2020 and a big discussion on the GAO investigation a few months ago. The discussions for it are on the talk page. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 11:59, 15 September 2021 (UTC)

• Prose: Generally precise but a bit jargon-heavy. (The widespread use of TLAs and mission codes reminds me more of a technical report than something written for a general audience). More details to follow below.

Can you point me to which acronyms/terms you find too technical? I know I use a lot of SRB/STS, but I think those are unavoidable in this article. Regarding abbreviations for systems and places, any specific feedback helps; I don't think I'm a good judge on what is good for the general audience after reading a lot of space material over the years. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 11:59, 15 September 2021 (UTC)

Will do in detail.

• Neutrality: I think the article could make stand out more how preventable this was, and I think that some people (including Feynman and potentially Boisjly) did put a lot more blame on NASA/Morton Thiokol management than comes out here. The lead does that quite well, but the article focuses very much on O-rings. (One story is "the O-ring let our heroes down", another story is "seven Americans became victims of management incompetence that sent them out in a known unsafe vehicle"). [I'd personally love to see what the Russians thought of it, given that it was the first time Americans died in the same way as Vladimir Komarov, but I don't expect you to research that]. The Britannica article is much shorter, but I think it gets the points across better.

  After careful reading, I think I should go back on this a little bit, and it is neutral overall.

• Sourcing/original research/formatting: Fine. You do rely very much on the Rogers report, which isn't as independent as one might like, but I've covered that in my Neutrality comments.
• Broadness: Does answer most questions. I'm curious about the mission objectives, though: were any of them realized in later missions? It was too late for the Halley's comet mission I guess, but what about the other plans?
• Copyvio: Seems fine.

Detailed comments

Will go through section by section, leaving lead for last.

STS-51-L

• Not a fan of the section title (which hasn't been explained in the article body yet, only in the lead). It also has a dual focus: what was supposed to be the mission, and the pre-flight delays (which could possibly be discussed elsewhere). The 2006 version lacked the mission background but was clearer on the delays.

  Renamed to "Space Shuttle mission" Balon Greyjoy (talk) 18:08, 22 September 2021 (UTC)

• Can you explain "STS-51-L" on first use and consider using it less often? ("The mission", "the spacecraft", "Challenger" could all be acceptable alternatives depending on sentence).

  Explained STS-51-L meaning in first sentence of section. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 18:10, 22 September 2021 (UTC)

  Removed excessive usage of "STS-51-L". Balon Greyjoy (talk) 21:58, 22 September 2021 (UTC)

• The mission objectives: I'm not totally sure I follow. Were they carrying the satellite and the rocket for a launch from LEO? What about the Greek (?) satellite? Were they supposed to just launch it or use it to observe Halley's comet?

  Added mission objectives. Does it address your questions? Balon Greyjoy (talk) 20:13, 22 September 2021 (UTC)

  Yes, much better. —Kusma (talk) 14:02, 23 September 2021 (UTC)

• Crew: you could either drop some unnecessary detail here (announcing date, "assigned in October as a payload specialist to conduct research for the Hughes Aircraft Company" or make it seem more relevant -- I'm still not sure what they were supposed to actually do, with the exception of McAuliffe).

  Shortened Jarvis description, and added information about the mission specialists. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 20:13, 22 September 2021 (UTC)

• Mention that "STS-61-C" was a space shuttle flight, and why this caused delays here. (I'd prefer to read something like "Challenger was scheduled to launch on January 22, but the delayed return of Columbia mission STS-61-C, caused the launch to be postponed" together with an explanation why these events were not completely independent).

  Done. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 21:58, 22 September 2021 (UTC)

• The "further delays" sentence is a bit long.

  Split into two sentences. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 21:58, 22 September 2021 (UTC)

• Perhaps explain where the ice came from and how it was dealt with (the 2006 version does a better job here). This comes up again in the "safety concern" section. Not sure about the best structure yet.

  I'm a little confused about this, as I think the current version does a more complete job of explaining where the ice came from and where it was found. I added that there was concern that the ice could be aspirated, but I'm not sure what else you're looking for regarding the ice on the launch tower. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 19:02, 23 September 2021 (UTC)

  I think I wasn't very clear here. The discussion of the ice in the later "safety concerns" section is fine (and even better now, thanks for adding more on why the ice was dangerous). Here in the "mission overview" section, the ice that needs to melt is a bit surprising as we haven't been told of the freezing temperatures yet. (The ice could conceivably have been a by-product of some other process going wrong). —Kusma (talk) 21:32, 23 September 2021 (UTC)

• Why not replace "KSC LC-39B" by the friendlier "Kennedy Space Center Launch Complex 39B"? That way, you don't have to explain what "LC-39B" means.

  Done. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 21:58, 22 September 2021 (UTC)

Safety concerns

• The section has essentially two parts: the general O-ring issues, and the cold temperatures at launch/go-ahead discussions. I'm not convinced that these things should be together in one section.

  Split the sections. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 13:33, 1 October 2021 (UTC)

• I kind of agree with the editor asking for clarification. We have four huge segments (how large?) that are already filled with propellant when they come to KSC, and then they are joined together in a process that later looked like File:STS-134 solid rocket booster segment stacking.jpg? They added O-rings and putty and then screwed/bolted the thing together?
• Also, zinc chromate/asbestos putty?

  Reduced to "putty" Balon Greyjoy (talk) 06:46, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

  Good.

• It would be nice to be told a little more about the size of the O-rings, and how large the joint "rotation" made the gap.

  Added the diameter of the O-rings. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 06:46, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

  That sentence is a bit broken now, I've tried to fix it.

• There's a lot of detail about previous O-ring issues, perhaps a bit too much. (All those mission codes are also confusing). Perhaps some of the detail might even be better in a subarticle? Space Shuttle solid rocket booster O-ring safety issues?? (better title needed).

  Tried cutting it down a bit; let me know what you think. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 08:27, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

  I like it. You cut just the part where it becomes boring and repetitive. Happy with this section now. —Kusma (talk) 20:04, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

Cold weather

• The air temperature on January 28 was low relative to other Space Shuttle launches, with STS-51-C launching with an air temperature 53 °F (12 °C). The reader not paying enough attention probably thinks this is talking about our shuttle (STS-51) and that it launched at 53 °F (which doesn't actually sound all that cold if you're not from Florida). Why not say that the weather was colder than in any previous launch, with the previous record 53 °F ?

  Agreed about 53 not sounding all that cold; updated. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 13:01, 1 October 2021 (UTC)

• Based upon O-ring erosion and blowby that had occurred in warmer launches, Morton-Thiokol engineers were concerned over the effect the cold temperatures would have on the seal provided by the SRB O-rings. Is this the general concern from above, or a specific concern they expressed on the day?

  Added a little bit to make it clear that it was for the launch. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 06:55, 6 October 2021 (UTC)

• Engineers ... were concerned that ice ... could potentially damage the orbiter's thermal protection system (Not something for you to do). Does sound like predicting the Columbia catastrophe :(
• Challenger was cleared to launch at 11:38 a.m. EST hmm... we've got a "Decision to launch" section coming up, and this one sounds like part of the decision to launch?

  Moved. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 10:18, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

  I like the restructuring and changes. Please check my edit of the tenses used, happy to be reverted if I made it worse. —Kusma (talk) 20:11, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

Decision to launch

• This is jumping a bit backwards and forwards in time. We know of the O-ring issues, we know of the ice, have cleared the shuttle to launch, and now it is suddenly a day earlier and we are deciding to launch. Consider the 2006 version: far fewer details, but much easier to understand what happened.

  I really struggled with how to best handle chronology. Putting all of the safety concerns at the beginning, which mostly predate any mission activity, makes it unclear how the O-ring/cold weather concerns fit into the launch schedule. But putting mission info, while "setting the scene" forces jumps in chronology. One thing would be to have an opening discussing the O-ring safety concerns, then go into the mission information, and then go into the launch decision. Thoughts? Balon Greyjoy (talk) 19:58, 22 September 2021 (UTC)

  I appreciate that it is difficult, and I don't have a good answer yet. If you move the O-ring issue to a specialised article and just put a two-paragraph summary here, this might become less relevant (currently the long section on O-rings on previous missions breaks the main flow). I'll think about it and will let you know if I have a good idea. —Kusma (talk) 14:02, 23 September 2021 (UTC)

  Perhaps you could put half of the mission info/plan first, up to and including the TDRS-B circuitry delay. Then discuss the general pre-flight safety concerns (Background on O-rings, known low temperature issues). From then it should flow quite well chronologically: pre-launch delays (Columbia issue, weather linked to certain abort scenarios), Morton Thiokol engineers debating and the management decision to greenlight the launch. Then you can shift the scene to KSC and talk about the ice related delay and the final go for takeoff, and then the very next thing will be launch and failure. [There's probably a flaw in my suggestion, but I hope it's worth thinking about]. —Kusma (talk) 21:44, 23 September 2021 (UTC)

  How do you like the new structure? Balon Greyjoy (talk) 13:57, 28 September 2021 (UTC)

  I think it is quite an improvement. Not sure it is the best possible, but certainly good enough for now. Please change the heading, though "O-rings concerns" doesn't sound good. "O-ring concerns" or "Concerns about O-rings" looks better. —Kusma (talk) 22:16, 28 September 2021 (UTC)

  Fixed the header. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 08:29, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

• Lawrence Mulloy, the NASA SRB project manager called Aldrich Do we know what their opinions were? And did they have any power to stop the launch?

  Reworded to show they supported launching. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 09:44, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

Launch and failure

Generally I am much happier with this section than the previous one.

• The STS-51-L mission began with the launch at 11:38 a.m I think you want to say that T+0 was at 11:38?

  Done. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 13:58, 28 September 2021 (UTC)

• the SSMEs were throttled to 104% of their rated maximum thrust this is weird until we follow the link to read that this is their nominal power level (I assume it is called "104%" for historical reasons).

  I added a note explaining it. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 13:32, 1 October 2021 (UTC)

• the SRBs began decreasing thrust at T+21.6, followed by the SSMEs throttling down to 94% at T+28. At T+35.379, the SSMEs throttled back further to 65% prior to max q If all of these are normal occurrences, perhaps give a little less detail?

  Shortened. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 13:32, 1 October 2021 (UTC)

• Prospect of crew escape: for context, one could perhaps mention that almost every other spacecraft does have launch abort systems?

  Added. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 14:10, 28 September 2021 (UTC)

Recovery of debris and crew

• propellent The spelling "propellant" seems more common in the relevant articles?

  Looks like I doubled down and spelled it both ways throughout the article! Standardized it to "propellant". Balon Greyjoy (talk) 19:03, 23 September 2021 (UTC)

• The debris from the SRBs was widely distributed due to the detonation of their linear shaped charges. Is the linear shape responsible? Or would any detonation at high altitude do that?

  They're always referred to as linear shaped charges; I can't speak for any high-altitude detonation, but I think stated that they were linear charges emphasizes that the boosters would separate into many pieces, rather than just 2 or 3 large chunks from a localized explosion. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 14:15, 28 September 2021 (UTC)

  Ah, so they run along the length of the SRB? —Kusma (talk) 22:21, 28 September 2021 (UTC)

  I believe so. I don't know if they run the entire length, but it is along those lines (pun not intended). Balon Greyjoy (talk) 08:44, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

• the damaged field joint what's a "field joint"?

  The term "field joint" is the description for the joint where the two O-rings were located. The term is used multiple times in "Solid Rocket Booster O-rings"; is it not clear later in the article to what that is referring to? Balon Greyjoy (talk) 20:07, 22 September 2021 (UTC)

  Sorry, my mistake from reading only parts of the article each day. —Kusma (talk) 14:04, 23 September 2021 (UTC)

• concluded crew compartment recovery until April 4 "continued until" or "concluded on" would look better?

  Mistake on my part! Changed. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 14:16, 28 September 2021 (UTC)

• Unidentified crew remains Is this everything else that wasn't definitely connected to any of the astronauts? We're left to assume this was possibly Resnik, but unidentifiable?

  I just take it to be sterile way of describing the remains recovered that were too damaged or small that they could not be identified. Regarding Resnik's remains, I have seen forum posts (definitely not WP:RS) stating she was buried at sea, but could not find a source stating what her family did with her remains. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 16:21, 28 September 2021 (UTC)

  I guess it's fine. There was a crazy German man obsessed with Resnik a few years ago [2], which made me extra curious. —Kusma (talk) 22:21, 28 September 2021 (UTC)

Rogers commission

• he argued that multiple components of the Space Shuttle, including the avionics and SSMEs in addition to the SRBs, were more dangerous and accident-prone than original NASA estimates. Hmm, IIRC Feynman explicitly praised the programming bit for the avionics, so is this perhaps simplifying a bit too much?

  According to the Appendix F, Feynman believes the programming was of quality and was mostly critical of the avionics hardware. I think it's going too much into detail of the specific aspects praised by Feynman, as his overall assessment was that the Space Shuttle had many different aspects that were all potentially underestimated dangers. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 19:13, 23 September 2021 (UTC)

  I think Feynman's report would come across better (more balanced) if you mentioned that it does contain some praise, but I won't insist. —Kusma (talk) 21:49, 23 September 2021 (UTC)

  Added mention of his praise. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 10:17, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

• Generally we have some decent criticism of NASA here and in the "U.S. House Committee report" subsection (not clear why it is a subsection of "Rogers commission" though). I think what still bugs me is that all the accused are nameless corporate entities that just diffuse blame and then nobody is really responsible.

  There's not a ton of new information in the US House Committee, so I didn't think it merits its own section. As it includes reviewing the findings of the Rogers Commission, I included it in the section because it is, in some sense, a "response" to the report. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 10:09, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

  Fair enough. —Kusma (talk) 20:11, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

NASA response

• There is some conceptual overlap between the section titles "response" and "aftermath". The NASA response is to the reports (so fairly late), the Aftermath includes some immediate and early things. Perhaps you should think about what a chronological way of telling this would look like (and then decide whether to implement that when you go for FAC): in a sense, the establishment of the Rogers commission is part of the aftermath of the disaster?

  I moved the section up to after the recovery section and renamed it "Public response". I know the Reagan and media responses preceded the recovery/salvage efforts, but I want to keep those sections together. Regarding the Rogers Comission, I know it could be considered part of the response, but I think it is significant enough to merit its own section. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 10:52, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

• Return to flight: The mention of Barbara Morgan here is a bit unconnected to the rest.

  Removed. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 19:09, 23 September 2021 (UTC)

  It is an interesting bit of astronaut trivia, but it felt out of place in this section. —Kusma (talk) 21:46, 23 September 2021 (UTC)

Aftermath

• The "media coverage" section is a bit short and seems incomplete, given how interested journalists were through the Rogers commission time. This would make more sense if you moved this before the Rogers commission section.

  I know the disaster was a large media event, but I'm not sure what else to put. The media doesn't seem to do much reporting on itself (understandably), and most of the articles focus on the disaster, which is covered in the remainder of this article. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 11:13, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

  OK.

• Engineering case study: Boisjoly here sounds a bit different in character from what we learn at Roger Boisjoly (and there could be a place to mention his AAAS Award for Scientific Freedom and Responsibility somewhere?)

  What are you suggesting gets changed here? Balon Greyjoy (talk) 11:14, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

  Not sure. I was wondering whether to mention that award, but in your current structure where this is mixed in with the immediate aftermath it might be a bit odd. Leaving as is for now is fine, but you could think about it for later. —Kusma (talk) 20:14, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

Legacy

• There are too many very short paragraphs here. Consider combining them a bit, and maybe use subsections to structure this. Beyonce Knowles feels a bit out of place here. The two objects retrieved from the flight could be mentioned also in "Recovery of debris" as they seem not to have been buried in missile silos.

  Combined paragraphs; removed Beyonce mention. I prefer the soccer ball and flag being left in this section; I acknowledge that they are recovered debris but I think their significance fits more in line with the legacy of the disaster. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 11:38, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

  Looks much better! —Kusma (talk) 20:14, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

Media

• Again, very short paragraphs. Combine them and/or add to them (what is so great about this book? why do you mention it here? reviews say what?) Are the films pro-NASA or anti-NASA? Shouldn't there be some discussion of Feynman's book?

  Added additional books/reviews. I also expanded the TV/film section a bit, but it was hard not to feel like I was repeating myself for all of them, as it's not like any of them take an approach different than critical of NASA. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 06:54, 6 October 2021 (UTC)

Overall a very promising article, lots of good stuff (and you've done great work already), but still needs some more work. Most important: section organisation, short paragraphs, overly technical language. Looking forward to further improvements! —Kusma (talk) 16:22, 22 September 2021 (UTC)

Thanks for the review! I'll get working on it! Balon Greyjoy (talk) 17:03, 22 September 2021 (UTC)

Lead

Almost forgot I still have to review the lead section. I have only very minor comments to make.

• The term "solid rocket motor" isn't used later

  Replaced with "SRB". Balon Greyjoy (talk) 08:00, 5 October 2021 (UTC)

• You could mention that there are two (redundant) O-rings, perhaps as simple as saying "failure of both O-ring seals"

  Added. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 08:01, 5 October 2021 (UTC)

• "SRBss" looks like a typo.

  Fixed. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 07:59, 5 October 2021 (UTC)

• You could mention that Endeavour was built as a replacement, and that changes were made in response to the disaster.

  Added Endeavour info to lead. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 08:19, 5 October 2021 (UTC)

I think that's all I have. —Kusma (talk) 20:43, 2 October 2021 (UTC)

@Kusma: I think I have addressed all of your points! Balon Greyjoy (talk) 06:57, 6 October 2021 (UTC)

I agree (sorry there were so many, I tried to be thorough). A very nice article! I'll go and do the paperwork for the GA status now. —Kusma (talk) 07:59, 6 October 2021 (UTC)

Please don't apologize for the large amount of feedback; I appreciate that there was a lot of communication and discussion on your part. Thanks for the review! Balon Greyjoy (talk) 09:10, 6 October 2021 (UTC)

Small comment

The Baldoni reference currently in the article is a Forbes contributor article. See WP:FORBESCON as to reliability. I don't see evidence of subject-matter expertise in what I've searched, but it may be the case he is. Whether this matters, I leave to whoever sees this. Urve (talk) 13:26, 8 October 2021 (UTC)

I can't find a good reliable source to replace it (alternatives are IMDB, Twitter, Rotten Tomatoes, and Moviefone). I'm inclined to leave it in, as it's not pushing any view point or controversial idea. But at the end of the day, it is not a good source to have. I can always remove mention of the movie if need be. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 09:02, 22 October 2021 (UTC)

possible error

The article contains the text "concerned that ice would be violently thrown during launch and could potentially damage the orbiter's thermal protection system or be aspirated into one of the engines". Do the engines aspirate anything from the external environment? 2A01:4C8:1425:5000:3CF3:1602:A1A3:F9AD (talk) 20:53, 9 October 2021 (UTC)AF

This information is coming from the Rogers Commission (page 115). The quote is "The third aspect is the one that has been discussed here of aspiration, what would happen when the large SRM motors ignite and in effect suck in air, referred to as aspiration, and ice additionally would come down, how much unknown." I'm not an engineer and can't assess how likely this would have been, but this is coming from what I consider a reliable source. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 09:07, 22 October 2021 (UTC)

Post-breakup image removal

@Balon Greyjoy: can you please elaborate on your removal [3] of the post-breakup image of Challenger's debris that you described as "unsourced image per FAC"? The image is quite clearly sourced from the Rogers Commission report, and features also on CBS News [4] (although differently cropped and rotated), where the piece of debris in question is annotated as "Crew module". Maybe the caption needs tweaking and a reference added, but the picture is anything but unsourced. --Deeday-UK (talk) 11:21, 22 October 2021 (UTC)

@Deeday-UK: Mistake on my part for the wording of the edit summary; I should have said "unlicensed" instead of "unsourced". Per the comment left by Nikkimaria on the FAC page, the image does not have an associated license with it. I found the source material in the Rogers Commission for the location of the crew compartment and agree that the image isn't unsourced, but I couldn't find the license for the image allowing it to be used (or modified for use) in a Wikipedia article. I hope that clears it up; my apologies for any confusion I caused. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 13:53, 22 October 2021 (UTC)

Infobox photo

I changed the photo in the infobox to standardize it with the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster page and moved the explosion picture down to the appropriate section in the page. While the explosion is the obvious cause for all the attention towards STS-51-L, I prefer the mission patch since I view it as all-encompassing of the mission. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 11:50, 23 October 2021 (UTC)

Already changed back! @Deeday-UK:, let me know what you think. I see in your edit summary your point the infobox photo is more recognizable, which I agree with, but I maintain the mission patch is a better representation of the crew and mission that are discussed throughout the article. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 11:53, 23 October 2021 (UTC)

I disagree. This article is about an event; there is a separate article about the mission and crew, and the mission patch could arguably be used as opening image there (but that's another discussion). The event itself can hardly be better summarised by any picture other than that iconic photo of the breakup, which generations of people must have been seeing anywhere that sad day was discussed, so it's just natural to do the same here. If there was a comparable, good-quality picture of the Columbia disaster, it would surely be used as infobox picture there too. --Deeday-UK (talk) 12:15, 23 October 2021 (UTC)

Fair enough. I'll leave it as is. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 05:21, 25 October 2021 (UTC)

Is this correct?

Section "Recovery of debris and crew": "...and eventually grew to 16 total ships managed by NASA, the US Air Force, and independent contractors." Is there any chance this is actually the navy?--Jarodalien (talk) 12:27, 20 November 2021 (UTC)

So you looked at the source and what did it say? Sixteen ships; four US Navy, three NASA, one US Air Force and eight contractor. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 17:53, 20 November 2021 (UTC)

I mean there's more ship managed by the navy than the air force, if we only mention one of them, perhaps the navy or just "US military", but what's we have now is ok.--Jarodalien (talk) 06:34, 21 November 2021 (UTC)

request edit article has been gafittied

request edit article has been gafittied someone has put thier name as part of page ID> — Preceding unsigned comment added by 185.156.245.39 (talk) 15:13, 28 January 2022 (UTC)

Phone number on page

Why was a phone number put on the page? This could intrude on someone’s privacy. Trains2021 (talk) 16:40, 28 January 2022 (UTC)

Also, it looks like the IPV6 address is from London near Charing X. Trains2021 (talk) 16:42, 28 January 2022 (UTC)

STS-51-L_Recovered_Debris_(Burn_Marks_on_the_SRM)_-_GPN-2004-00004.jpg

This file might need removal, wooden floor is suspicious. --5.43.74.120 (talk) 05:36, 29 January 2022 (UTC)

Citations?

I don’t see any citations directing us to original sources for most of this information. Crew survived initial break-up? Source? 216.164.55.2 (talk) 18:44, 31 January 2022 (UTC)

I don't know why the lead says it (without delving into the topic), but source 21 seems to confirm it. (CC) Tbhotch^™ 19:04, 31 January 2022 (UTC)

It's cited in the body; cite not needed in the lead. See the "Cause and time of death" section. VQuakr (talk) 20:31, 31 January 2022 (UTC)

Cause and time of death

The article's description of the cause and timing of the astronauts' death is misleading, suggesting that the explosion, and not the crash into the ocean more than two minutes later, killed them. In fact the lede sentence says that the shuttle "broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, killing all seven crew members aboard".

Though information on the subject is incomplete, it is clear that at least two astronauts survived the explosion and manipulated switches afterward. It cannot be shown that any of them died in the explosion.

The "Cause and time of death" section discusses the likelihood that the astronauts lost consciousness. But lack of oxygen wouldn't kill a person in two minutes and 45 seconds. The NIH's hypoxia information page says that "Brain cells are extremely sensitive to oxygen deprivation and can begin to die within five minutes after oxygen supply has been cut off. When hypoxia lasts for longer periods of time, it can cause coma, seizures, and even brain death."

The likeliest outcome was that all seven astronauts survived the explosion and fall, and were killed by the crash. We should be clearer on that point. At the least, we should stop asserting (anywhere, let alone in the lede sentence) that the explosion killed them. TypoBoy (talk) 16:37, 15 March 2022 (UTC)

• We can't say when they died based on the NIH' unrelated page (WP:SYNTH and WP:OR). All we can say is what the sources say. If you have reliable sources that are saying when they died and it contradicts what is here, it *might* be included with the proper disclaimer, indicating there is some conflict as to when they actually died. You should introduce that here on the talk page, then discuss before making changes, as that is a core part of the article, and changing it without discussion is always going to be reverted. Dennis Brown - 2¢ 17:01, 15 March 2022 (UTC)

Different interpretation, but I don't think that the article implies they died in the explosion. The sentence in the lead states that the orbiter broke up in the flight, and the 7 crew members were killed as a result, which is true regardless of when the crew members died. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 12:52, 6 May 2022 (UTC)

Use of "Space Shuttle" over "shuttle"

While the term "shuttle" is often used in communications and in shorthand to describe the Space Shuttle (as well as incorrectly referring to the orbiter), it is not the actual name of the spacecraft. While use of "Space Shuttle" is wordier than "shuttle", the appropriate name should be used over the shorthand version of it. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 02:35, 12 July 2022 (UTC)

I don't see why. In the context of this article, it's very clear what we're referring to. Demanding we use the proper name is needless pedantry and not helpful for readability. — The Hand That Feeds You:^Bite 19:45, 12 July 2022 (UTC)

This article, or any article that comes to mind, doesn't establish that "shuttle" is a nickname for the Space Shuttle. I would argue that "spacecraft" would be a more acceptable term to avoid the proper name. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 23:51, 12 July 2022 (UTC)

Seriously? This is WP:SKYBLUE territory, we don't need to cite that people refer to the Space Shuttle as the shuttle. — The Hand That Feeds You:^Bite 13:35, 13 July 2022 (UTC)

I agree with THTFY. I'd say its even wrong (and i'm pretty sure this debate has been settled before somewhere). The Space Shuttle is a 'system' and we are not referring to it here in the sense of the system (in most cases which Balon changed at least), but to one specific shuttle. Therefor usage of a proper noun is not warranted here, other then when we are explaining that this is one shuttle of the Space Shuttle type, a part of the Space Shuttle program. —TheDJ (talk • contribs) 18:23, 13 July 2022 (UTC)

I hate to feel obtuse, and I re-read OP's comment ten times, thinking I must have missed something, and wanted to believe that this could have been important. But can't imagine why OP thinks there's some suddenly mandatory proper noun versus common noun in exactly one spot, repeatedly. Or how he thinks that was a justification above. It's a mile-long version of "because I said so". Even bringing it to Talk was a waste of everyone's time over truly nothing, obviously. Proper versus common? Seriously? — Smuckola(talk) 21:40, 31 July 2022 (UTC)

It appears consensus is against my original point of view. Thanks TheDJ for bringing up a way of thinking about it that I had not previously considered. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 14:57, 1 August 2022 (UTC)

Inclusion of Overmyer and Kerwin Report quotes

@Smuckola: You have reinserted direct quotations from Overmyer and the Kerwin Report, despite previous discussions here and here that resulted in a consensus against their conclusion. Per the guidance in WP:FAOWN and WP:ONUS, please open a discussion before making big changes to the article; the article has undergone a community review and there were no requests to include the previously removed material. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 14:48, 1 August 2022 (UTC)

I wouldn't call those two discussions a consensus against their conclusion. That said, I'm indifferent on whether or not the quotes are left out. — The Hand That Feeds You:^Bite 15:23, 1 August 2022 (UTC)

@Balon Greyjoy: Thank you for the reminder of WP:FAOWN, which indicates my correctness more clearly, and how ya better duck from that boomerang! I didn't make any big or controversial changes at all, but rather mostly literally minor copy editing and fixing lots of little errors, which you blindly and indiscriminately re-errored. It had countless rhetorical verbosities like "thus NASA made the Office of Safety, to improve safety". As above with "Space Shuttle" (it wasn't consensus; it was just obviously wrong), and as with the old quotation thread, your response is pedantically WP:IDONTLIKEIT and WP:OWN. You really truly do lean toward believing that your arbitrary opinion is absolute fact, and extra amazingly, that everyone should or did agree. Absolutely no such thing occurred. In fact quite the opposite, because not one person raised a legitimate objection, because it didn't violate MOS:QUOTE (and is the meaning of "when appropriate"), and because you simply WP:IDIDNTHEARTHAT-ed everything I said in a one-sided edit war. Again I thank you for your struggle to improve such heinously intense content with your fantastic contributions, my friend. — Smuckola(talk) 04:23, 2 August 2022 (UTC)

As I've said before, there is no need for quoted material when it can be paraphrased, as is the case with the conclusions from an official report. There's no increased significance to the original wording that is lost when it is reworded. While there is an importance in direct quotations when necessary, such as the Reagan speech, Overmyer's quote is baseless; he claims that the commander flew the crew compartment, which lacked any control surfaces or ability to fly. Having that quote be the final word gives it undue weight, when there is no conclusion on if the crew were alive or conscious past the initial breakup of the orbiter. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 15:18, 2 August 2022 (UTC)

RfC for quotes inclusion in "Cause and time of death" subsection

The following discussion is an archived record of a request for comment. Please do not modify it. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

A summary of the debate may be found at the bottom of the discussion.

---

Should the "Cause and time of death" subsection include the direct quotations from Joseph Kerwin's report, Michael Mullane's book, and an interview with Robert Overmyer? Balon Greyjoy (talk) 15:54, 2 August 2022 (UTC)

I lean towards inclusion, but with a slight restructuring. I agree that ending the section with Overmyer may place undue weight on the theory that the crew survived until ocean impact, so I suggest moving that paragraph to between the paragraph that discusses lever locks and the paragraph that introduces the Kerwin report. This ends the section with the Kerwin report bullet points, which feels like a nice way to sum up the whole 'maybe but we just can't know' thing. NekoKatsun (nyaa) 17:47, 2 August 2022 (UTC)

Thanks for your input. What are your thoughts on paraphrasing the Overmyer quote and say that he insisted the crew was alive? I just think that the Kerwin report, in theory, has the greatest body of evidence, so I don't want it to make it seem like Overmyer has some additional information to draw a different conclusion. Additionally, the paragraph prior to the Kerwin bullet points paraphrases and summarizes the bullet points; if the bullet points stay in I believe the paragraph should be taken out. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 22:03, 2 August 2022 (UTC)

Hmm. Regarding Overmyer, the specificity of the quote noting that he flew with and owned a plane with Scobee provides context as to why specifically he might think that. Looking at it and thinking about paraphrasing, I'm having trouble coming up with something satisfying; do you have any suggestions? The best I've got thus far is "Astronaut and NASA lead accident investigator Robert Overmyer, who flew with Scobee and owned a plane with him, believed that most or all of the crew were alive and possibly conscious during the entire descent until impact with the ocean." and that's 1) not much less wordy, 2) kind of awkward, and 3) tonally dull.

I agree about the Kerwin report having the greatest apparent body of evidence. I feel that the paragraph prior to the bullet points does contain extra information, though, notably information about pressurization details and clarifying that regardless as to whether the crew survived the initial breakup, the impact with the ocean was not survivable. I could see perhaps replacing the second sentence ("Kerwin's reports could not determine...") with the bullet points, and then trimming and moving the rest of that paragraph (from "Depressurization would have caused..." onward) to after the bullet points. This would give us something like:

Proposed text (collapsed for readability)

On July 28, 1986, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Flight, former astronaut Richard H. Truly, released a report on the deaths of the crew from physician and Skylab 2 astronaut Joseph P. Kerwin. According to the Kerwin Report: The findings are inconclusive. The impact of the crew compartment with the ocean surface was so violent that evidence of damage occurring in the seconds which followed the disintegration was masked. Our final conclusions are: the cause of death of the Challenger astronauts cannot be positively determined; the forces to which the crew were exposed during Orbiter breakup were probably not sufficient to cause death or serious injury; and the crew possibly, but not certainly, lost consciousness in the seconds following Orbiter breakup due to in-flight loss of crew module pressure. Pressurization could have enabled consciousness for the entire fall until impact, while depressurization would have caused the crew to quickly lose consciousness, as the PEAPs supplied only unpressurized air. The mid-deck floor had not suffered buckling or tearing, as would result from a rapid decompression, but stowed equipment showed damage consistent with decompression, and debris embedded between the two forward windows may have caused a loss of pressure. The crew cabin hit the ocean surface at 207 mph (333 km/h) approximately two minutes and 45 seconds after breakup with an estimated deceleration of 200 g, far exceeding structural limits of the crew compartment or crew survivability levels. Impact damage to the crew cabin was severe enough that it could not be determined if the crew cabin had been previously damaged enough to lose pressurization.

I lean very slightly towards preferring that paragraph ending with the bullet points, tonally speaking, but it's a personal preference instead of anything policy-based (or, honestly, grammar-based). Thoughts? NekoKatsun (nyaa) 23:08, 2 August 2022 (UTC)

The issue I take with the Overmyer quote is that I don't see how flying with Scobee and owning a plane together gives Overmyer additional insight into whether or not Scobee (and the rest of the crew) was conscious and alive. It would make more sense in the context of Scobee being conscious and Overmyer speculating on his actions. But considering that it's inconclusive on whether the cabin lost pressure, it's a big leap for Overmyer to speculate that not only were they conscious but that Scobee was trying to fly the crew cabin.

I personally prefer not using bullet points, but that's personal preference. I think there's still some repetition between the bullet points and the paragraph below, but it's definitely an improvement to put it in that order.

What are you thoughts on the Mullane quote about the PEAPs? Balon Greyjoy (talk) 11:39, 3 August 2022 (UTC)

I'm fine with including the Overmyer quote as just his opinion. So long as we make it clear this is just his view, it's worth including. I'd leave out that they owned a plane together as irrelevant.

My question is then why is it included if it's just his opinion? I don't mean to devalue Overmyer's opinion, but I'm not sure why his opinion in particular should be included but others' are not. The quote doesn't include new information about why he feels that way. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 16:42, 3 August 2022 (UTC)

The wording above for the Kerwin report is great, including bullet points, and I think that's ready to go into the article. — The Hand That Feeds You:^Bite 13:02, 3 August 2022 (UTC)

I think the current paraphrasing makes it look like the entire Kerwin report info is lifted directly from the report, as it starts with "our final conclusions are:" but doesn't indicate that it's just the bullet points. How should it be clear what is and what isn't a direct quote? Balon Greyjoy (talk) 16:38, 3 August 2022 (UTC)

The quote block will make it very clear that only the bullet points are directly copied from the report. — The Hand That Feeds You:^Bite 17:44, 3 August 2022 (UTC)

I moved the bullet points up ahead of the paraphrased section to be in line with the proposed text above. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 15:23, 19 August 2022 (UTC)

• In general, my personal preference is to avoid picking quotes, so only have a quote when the quote is famous enough to make it WP:DUE. The paraphrasing shown above looks good. Cheers Markbassett (talk) 12:53, 3 August 2022 (UTC)

  Are you referring to both the Overymyer and Mullane quote, or one in particular? Balon Greyjoy (talk) 16:39, 3 August 2022 (UTC)

  Any and all quotes, which in this case means use the paraphrased Kerwin report bullets. Cheers Markbassett (talk) 13:22, 15 August 2022 (UTC)

  I agree that quotes should be used when the exact phrasing is needed and that otherwise paraphrasing is better, but quoting versus paraphrasing is not the only issue here and I suggest that it's not the most important one: where a quote is not pertinent, often paraphrasing does not make it more pertinent. Dominic Mayers (talk) 15:23, 15 August 2022 (UTC)

• Each of the quotations from Joseph Kerwin's report, Michael Mullane's book, and an interview with Robert Overmyer requires a separate analysis. I picked one of them, the "interview" with Robert Overmyer, and have not looked at the others. I read the source (which by the way is not an interview) and I think the quote is of secondary importance in the source. The main reason, according to the source, why Robert Overmyer believes the crew survived is his analysis of the facts. There is a kind WP:SYNTH in putting this quote, which is about his personal relation with a member of the crew, as an explanation for

  [he] believed that most or all of the crew were alive and possibly conscious during the entire descent until impact with the ocean.

  The quote itself could be fine in a different context in the article. Dominic Mayers (talk) 13:47, 8 August 2022 (UTC)
• I don't have an opinion on whether to include the part about owning a plane, but, "I know Scob did everything he could to save his crew. Scob fought for any and every edge to survive. He flew that ship without wings all the way down" is reliably sourced, a prominent opinion, and phrased far more evocatively than any Wikipedia editor could manage. Strong Keep on that much. Sennalen (talk) 23:10, 8 August 2022 (UTC)

  In case this was a reply to my comment, I have nothing against this quote per se. My point is that it violates WP:SYNTH to put it as an explanation for a belief based on facts that most of the crew were alive during the entire descent. The reason is not that he knows Scob. Dominic Mayers (talk) 00:02, 9 August 2022 (UTC)

  @Sennalen: I understand that is a reliably sourced quote, but there's no evidence presented as to why Overmyer believes that. He claims that Scobee flew the crew compartment, which has no flight control surface or means of propulsion. Scobee and the rest of the crew may or may not have been alive, but presenting Overmyer's quote gives undue weight to his opinion. Paraphrasing presented by Dominic Mayers better indicates that it was Overmyer's opinion alone. I think it could be modified slightly to avoid WP:SYNTH. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 01:01, 9 August 2022 (UTC)

  Just to clarify, my original comment has two aspects. The first is that each quote requires a full analysis based on sources. The scope of the RfC was too broad. The second is that my understanding of the source provided for Overmyer's quote is that his belief (which is shared by others who studied the case with him) is based on a technical analysis of the facts, not on what Overmyer knows about Scobee. This being said, I am not expert. I have tried to understand the source the best I can. As a group we might come to understand that source differently, but the discussion has to be around the source (or other sources) about Overmyer and his team opinion. Dominic Mayers (talk) 01:41, 9 August 2022 (UTC)

  I think you're taking it too literally. When he says Scobee "flew it all the way down", he means he didn't give up. It's a character endorsement. As the opinion of the lead investigator, it can't be undue, and as an emotional tribute to a friend, it can't be summarized by Wikipedia editors. Sennalen (talk) 01:57, 9 August 2022 (UTC)

  It's confusing to write "A:B" in which A is the conclusion of a study expressed by the a lead investigator and B is a tribute to a friend. I am not sure how we can insert a tribute to a friend in a section about time and cause of death and whether we should do it, but the way it is done now is confusing. Dominic Mayers (talk) 02:14, 9 August 2022 (UTC)

  I agree that there should not be a tribute to his friend. Regarding Overmyer's conclusion, I'm sure that Overmyer is correct in his assessment that Scobee wouldn't give up if he was alive and conscious post-breakup, there's no additional evidence provided that this is the case. Somewhat related to his claims, I can't find any sources of what investigation that Overmyer served as the lead investigator; there's this NY Times article and Harwood's article that reference him as a lead investigator, but he's not one of the members of the Rogers Commission and isn't mentioned in the Kerwin Report or House Committee report, so I'm not sure which investigation is being referred to. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 03:07, 15 August 2022 (UTC)

  There is no need that the investigation was acknowledged by some "official" source. Wikipedia does not report the "official" source only. Any rule that would reject a point of view, because it's not "official" is against NPOV. The only question to ask is whether the POV was notorious, i.e., whether it had a non negligible number of partisans. It seems that it is notorious, perhaps mistaken, but this is not something that Wikipedia should be concerned with. Instead, it should remain neutral and report what the sources say without claiming that any POV is the truth. However, by reporting all the POVs, with the arguments provided (possibly the primary sources, when they are used by secondary sources), it should allow the readers to make their own opinions. NPOV does not mean that some readers should not be able to pick one POV as the best in view of the information provided. It only means that Wikipedia must remain neutral in providing the information. Dominic Mayers (talk) 06:00, 15 August 2022 (UTC)

  Just as a point of order: NPOV does not mean reporting all the POVs. WP:DUE is absolutely a consideration. — The Hand That Feeds You:^Bite 16:40, 15 August 2022 (UTC)

  Yes, absolutely and that's why I mentioned that the POV has to be notorious. Sources say that Overmyer was one of the main investigators for the NASA. That makes it notorious. His view was reported in a few sources. It seems that in front of the same evidence, Overmyer had a different conclusion than the official report. The official report says we don't know if they were conscious. Overmyer concluded that they were alive and that "Scob fought for any and every edge to survive. He flew that ship without wings all the way down.” I agree that it definitely should not be presented as the truth and it should not have more weight than the official report. It's a good idea that the final words in the section are those of the official report, but not as the truth. Wikipedia provides the information in a neutral manner. Dominic Mayers (talk) 17:44, 15 August 2022 (UTC)

  Would it work to move it up and paraphrase it? My thought is to put in Overmyer's POV before the Kerwin report. Something like "Astronaut and NASA lead accident investigator Robert Overmyer believed that at least some of the crew, Scobee in particular, were alive and conscious after the explosion." I think that conveys his opinion without extraneous information (owning a plane together) and without metaphor (flying a crew cabin). Balon Greyjoy (talk) 15:09, 19 August 2022 (UTC)

  My understanding is that there is little doubt that they were conscious after the explosion at the least for a few seconds, because they activated the PEAPs. The only part that is not clear is whether the pressure remained long enough to allow them to remain conscious until the end. So, it would be confusing to present the view "... alive and conscious after the explosion" as the special view of Overmyer. What is special about Overmyer's view is that they remained conscious until the last moment. The only thing that I start to worry about is the reliability of the sources, because the more I read the sources, the more I find it surprising that Overmyer has contradicted the official report and the more a POV is surprising, the more the sources need to be reliable. To my knowledge, no recent source reports this view. Overmyer might have been quoted out of context. I do not worry about notoriety, but reliability might be a concern. So, either we drop entirely this special point of view of Overmyer, not because it's not notorious, but because the sources might not be reliable, or else, we report what Overmyer said accurately: they remained conscious until the last moment. Dominic Mayers (talk) 15:44, 19 August 2022 (UTC)

  Regarding my confusing wording, I agree that it makes more sense to change it to something like "Alive and conscious until they impacted the ocean." But I also believe that Overmyer's quote may be out of context, or it is an unreliable narrative. The Harwood article has the narrative that the astronauts were all conscious, and seems to disregard the disputes/unknowns regarding the crews' consciousness. My vote is to remove Overmyer's point of view entirely. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 19:39, 19 August 2022 (UTC)

  My vote would also be to remove Overmyer's point of view entirely if we want an article that can pretend to only provide solid scientific opinions, because Overmyer's point of view does not seem to have been expressed in that context. On the other hand, and I know that I am switching view a lot here, maybe the article could include this kind of notorious opinions, as long as we do not mislead the readers about their unreliable nature. In that context, I would even use the recent Netflix documentary as a source. There should be a clean distinction between the official report, which is modest about what we actually know, and opinions expressed in other contexts. This is something that the editors that actually write the article can decide. Dominic Mayers (talk) 20:48, 19 August 2022 (UTC)

  Just to clarify, WP must absolutely be reliable, but saying that a source, say Netflix, reported the opinion of X, can be a very reliable fact from a WP perspective, even though Netflix or X might not be viewed as reliable by the readers. WP can remain neutral and simply report the information. Again, this is something that the editors who actually write the article can decide. Dominic Mayers (talk) 21:11, 19 August 2022 (UTC)

  While plenty of the information in the article is from a single source that is not necessarily scientific, I would argue that contentious information should be, and has been, supported by solid claims. It would be one thing if the official report stated that the astronauts were unconscious soon after the explosion and that Overmyer contradicted it, but instead the official investigation states that there isn't enough information to know definitively one way or the other. I don't see the need to introduce unreliable view points if they are not introducing any new information. Regarding the argument to make a distinction on the official report and others' opinion, is the wording a few comments up not sufficient for delineating the two? Balon Greyjoy (talk) 21:13, 19 August 2022 (UTC)

  I agree with what you say. I think the wording should be made even more neutral by not stating that Overmyer believed they were conscious until the impact, because I am not convinced that he believed that. The source is not reliable enough for that. Instead, I would write according to X, Overmyer believed ..., because this is the only fact that I am sure of. But then, we could as well include other opinions from other sources. I agree that, from a scientific perspective, it does not say more than what is already in the official report, but the fact that these opinions exist is a new information in itself. Some might consider it pertinent. I have no strong opinion. Dominic Mayers (talk) 21:30, 19 August 2022 (UTC)

  I think the best course of action is to remove it; you bring up a good point about not being sure that Overmyer actually believed that information. The only record of that is the Harwood article, and I think it reads strangely to say something like "According to William Harwood, Overmyer believed..." I'll leave this up for a another day or two in case any other editors want to weigh in, and will plan on removing the reference to the Overmyer quote when I close the RfC. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 11:14, 20 August 2022 (UTC)

  This plan looks good to me. Dominic Mayers (talk) 12:18, 20 August 2022 (UTC)

• I'm not seeing any arguments to keep the Mullane quote. The information about a lack of training to use the PEAPs in a depressurization emergency is mentioned earlier in the paragraph; I don't think it needs to restated as a quote. Balon Greyjoy (talk) 15:11, 19 August 2022 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Parts found

There does not seem to be an appropriate section unless I am missing something. Here is the story.— Vchimpanzee • talk • contributions • 18:35, 11 November 2022 (UTC)

@Vchimpanzee It's mentioned at the bottom of "Recovery of debris and crew". Andrew Gray (talk) 18:55, 11 November 2022 (UTC)

Oh, right. That wouldn't be chronological.— Vchimpanzee • talk • contributions • 22:20, 11 November 2022 (UTC)

"Spaceship explosion" listed at Redirects for discussion

An editor has identified a potential problem with the redirect Spaceship explosion and has thus listed it for discussion. This discussion will occur at Wikipedia:Redirects for discussion/Log/2023 January 31 § Spaceship explosion until a consensus is reached, and readers of this page are welcome to contribute to the discussion. ✠ SunDawn ✠ (contact) 03:13, 31 January 2023 (UTC)

Featured picture scheduled for POTD

Hello! This is to let editors know that File:Challenger flight 51-l crew.jpg, a featured picture used in this article, has been selected as the English Wikipedia's picture of the day (POTD) for January 28, 2024. A preview of the POTD is displayed below and can be edited at Template:POTD/2024-01-28. For the greater benefit of readers, any potential improvements or maintenance that could benefit the quality of this article should be done before its scheduled appearance on the Main Page. If you have any concerns, please place a message at Wikipedia talk:Picture of the day. Thank you! --Ahecht (TALK
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The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster was the first fatal accident to an American spacecraft in flight. On January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart 73 seconds into the flight of STS-51-L, the 25th mission of NASA's Space Shuttle program. All seven crew members aboard were killed. The spacecraft disintegrated 46,000 feet (14 km) above the Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida, at 11:39 am EST. This official portrait of the STS-51-L crew was taken on November 15, 1985. In the back row, from left to right, are Ellison Onizuka, Christa McAuliffe, Gregory Jarvis, and Judith Resnik. In the front row, from left to right, are Michael J. Smith, Dick Scobee, and Ronald McNair.

Photograph credit: NASA

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